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ABSTRACT
The ability to eectively match supply and demand can lead to signicant revenue
benets in the airline industry. Airline supply management deals with assigning the
right resources (i.e., aircraft and crew) to the right routes in the ight network. Due
to certain crew regulations, operating characteristics, and constraints of the airline
companies, these supply management decisions need to be made well in advance of
departures, at a time when demand is highly uncertain. However, demand forecasts
improve markedly over time, as more information on demand patterns is gathered.
Thus, exploiting the exibilities in the system that allows the partial postponement of
supply decisions to a later time, when more accurate demand information is obtained,
can signicantly improve the airline's revenue. In this thesis, we propose and analyze
the Demand Driven Swapping (DDS) approach that aims at improving the airline's
revenue by reducing the supply-demand mismatches through dynamically swapping
aircraft as departures approach. This research has been done in collaboration with
our industrial partner, the United Airlines Research and Development Division.
Due to the proximity to departures, the DDS problem is restricted by two main
constraints: 1) the initial crew schedule needs to be kept intact (due to certain union
contracts); and 2) airport services and operations need to be preserved to the greatest
extent possible. As a result, only a limited number of simple swaps can be performed
between aircraft types of the same family (i.e. crew-compatible aircraft types). How-
ever, the swaps can be potentially performed on a daily basis given the initial eet
assignments. Clearly, the swapping criteria, frequency, and timing will highly impactthe revenue benets of the DDS approach. When the swapping decisions are made
several weeks prior to departures (i.e., 4-6 weeks before departures), they will not
cause much disturbance to the operations, but will be performed under highly uncer-
tain demand information. On the other hand, swapping decisions that are delayed
to a time later (i.e., 1-3 weeks before departures) will decrease the possibility of bad
swaps, but will result in larger costs due to the higher disruptions to airport services
and operations. Thus our research objective is to provide guidelines and principles
on how the exible capacity should be managed in the system. For this purpose,
we study the eectiveness of dierent swapping strategies, characterized in terms of
their frequency and timing, for hedging against the demand uncertainty. We rst
study stylized analytical models to gain insights into the critical parameters that
aect these benets. Simulation models are then conducted to test the validity of
our analytical ndings as well as to analyze more complex strategies and assess the
dynamic performance of these strategies.
The analytical results indicate that strategies that make the swapping decision
early in time (in order to minimize disturbances to the operations) perform very well
on routes, where the demand uncertainty is low and the expected demands on the
legs are well-balanced. Otherwise, a swapping strategy, which revises the swapping
decision over time, should be implemented. Our simulation results, based on real
data obtained from United Airlines, conrm the analytical ndings.
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Introduction
Today's highly uncertain and competitive market place is forcing the airline industry
to look for new approaches and strategies to stay protable. The ability to closely
match supply and demand, which has always been a determining factor of nancial
success in any industry, is attracting renewed attention in the airline industry. Airline
\supply management" deals with assigning the right resources (i.e., aircraft, each
having dierent capacity; and crew, each having dierent qualications) to the right
ight legs in the network (i.e., ight legs at specic departure times between origin-
destination pairs), whereas airline \demand management" focuses on capturing the
right mix of passengers (i.e., passengers with dierent itineraries, exibilities, and
price utilities).
Certain regulations, operating characteristics, and constraints of the airline indus-
try dictate that most tactical scheduling and assignment decisions, which aect the
airline's supply, be made well in advance of ight departures, at a time when demand
is highly uncertain. As a result, the focus of the airline industry has, so far, been on
demand management techniques (also referred to as revenue or yield management),
and their use of supply management has been very limited: With capacity utilizations
12
around 70% (based on personal communications with United Airlines managers), air-
lines still experience a signicant passenger loss due to insucient capacity. Thus,
there is much room for improvement, because no matter how sophisticated their de-
mand management systems are, airlines are still working under sub-optimal solutions
when they need to x their supply well in advance, under limited demand information.
In fact, more eective and robust supply decisions are still possible by exploiting the
inherent exibilities in the system, which allow the partial postponement (or modi-
cation) of these decisions to a time closer to departures, when more information on
demand patterns is gathered and demand uncertainty is greatly reduced. Thus, this
exibility needs to be considered when managing supply and demand in the airline
industry. However, research that focuses on the benets of decision postponement
strategies for airline supply management, and studies their value, is extremely limited.
Motivated by these observations, Bish and Sherali (2001) propose a three-stage
airline supply management framework, which systematically revises the supply deci-
sions over time, taking advantage of the more accurate demand forecasts obtained as
departures approach. The focus is on the airline's eeting decisions (i.e., assignment
of aircraft capacity to dierent ight legs in the network); see Bish and Sherali, 2001,
for details on this framework. This supply management framework is devised so as to
postpone certain parts of the initial eeting decision to a time closer to departures,
by utilizing the exibility in the system. This is accomplished through an initial eet
assignment model that is paired with downstream models, demand driven re-eeting
and swapping. Our focus in this thesis is on the \demand-driven swapping" model.
This thesis is a sequel to the Demand Driven Re-eeting stage (see Sherali, Bish,
and Zhu, 2001), and has been conceived in collaboration with the United Airlines
Research and Development Division as our industry partner.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.1, we provide more details on3
the problem. Section 1.2 then presents the research questions that we propose to
study in this thesis.
1.1 Background and Motivation
Two major components of airline supply management include the \eet assignment"
process, which refers to the assignment of aircraft to the ight legs in the network,
and the \crew scheduling" process, which refers to the assignment of each crew to
those ight legs that it is qualied to y. Throughout this thesis, we will refer to an
\aircraft type" as the set of aircraft, each having the same cockpit conguration, crew
rating, and capacity. An example is the B737-300 aircraft type. Similarly, we refer to
an \aircraft family" as the set of aircraft types having the same cockpit conguration
and crew rating. Thus, the same crew can y any aircraft type of the same family,
even when they are of dierent capacities. An example is the Boeing 737 family, which
consists of multiple aircraft types, including the B737-300, B737-400, and B737-500,
having capacity ranges between 110-168 passengers.
In order to manage their supply, most major airlines utilize a eet comprised of
multiple aircraft types so as to be able to match the aircraft capacity with the fore-
casted ight demand. This is important, because if the demand observed on a ight
leg exceeds the capacity of the aircraft assigned to that leg, then unsatised passen-
gers will be spilled (lost). On the other hand, if demand turns out to be lower than the
capacity assigned, then excess seats will be spoiled, incurring higher operational costs.
However, dependencies between several airline processes dictate that the eeting de-
cision is made quite early in time, under limited demand information. For example,
the eeting decision is an essential input to the crew scheduling process, which, by
typical union contracts and government regulations, needs to be completed well in4
advance of departures (i.e., 8-12 weeks out at United Airlines). Thus, a eeting deci-
sion needs to be made even earlier, under high demand uncertainty (demand standard
deviations of 20-50% of the mean for any ight leg are typical at this time; see Berge
and Hopperstad, 1993; Kniker, 1998). In addition, since most crew members are cer-
tied to y only one aircraft family due to the cockpit conguration, any revision to
eet assignments that requires changes in the current crew assignments will be very
dicult and expensive to implement. As a result, the main focus of airlines so far has
been on demand management (see, for instance, the many references in Mcgill and
van Ryzin, 1999). In contrast, their use of systematic supply management strategies
has been very limited.
Thus, the eet assignment problem needs to be solved quite early in time for
the entire eet over a planning period. Solving such a large scale problem early in
time hinders the consideration of a more accurate and detailed demand information
in the eeting process. Indeed, the demand information, utilized by the traditional
eet assignment models proposed in the Operations Research literature and in use
by major airlines, is very limited. Specically, the demand information used in the
traditional eet assignment process suers from the following major drawbacks.
 Most eeting models generate the \same-every-day" eeting solution (i.e., the
same eet assignments are used every day of the planning period), considering
only an aggregated demand information over the dierent days of the week (or
month). This is due to the need to limit the size of the eeting model to a man-
ageable level. However, demand patterns on the same leg may vary signicantly
over dierent days of the week (\day-of-week (DOW) variation"); for exam-
ple, Mondays and Fridays are usually higher demand days for business markets.
In addition, such an aggregated demand information fails to consider the un-
certainty that demand on any given day will have around its mean (\variation5
around the mean"). In addition, the parameters of the demand distribution
need to be estimated well in advance of departures. However, demand parame-
ters will probably not be known with certainty a priori at that time (\forecast
error").
Although the need to address these limitations in the eeting decision has been ac-
knowledged by many researchers in the airline industry, the related work has been
extremely limited due to the underlying diculties. Specically, the large size of the
eeting problem, which can easily involve thousands of ight legs and several aircraft
types, and the time-frame involved (i.e., demand forecasts at the time of the eeting
are not very reliable, but they improve markedly over time) hinder the consideration
of all the foregoing enhancements in the initial eeting stage. Thus, updates to the
initial eet assignment, as departures approach and more accurate demand forecasts
are obtained, become inevitable to implement in order to manage the day-of-week
variation, demand variation around its mean on any given day, and the forecast er-
ror. However, there are two main restrictions on these re-assignments:
1. The initial crew schedule needs to be kept intact.
2. Due to the close proximity to departures, scheduled airport services and oper-
ations need to be preserved to the greatest extent.
As a result, only a limited number of swaps (exchanges) between aircraft types of
the same family are possible at this later stage, but the swaps can be potentially
performed on a daily basis, given the initial eet assignments. This added exibility
provides an increased ability to hedge against the two types of demand variation:
(i) DOW variation (\variation in the mean") and (ii) demand variation around its
mean on any particular day (\variation around the mean"), as well as (iii) demand6
forecast errors (i.e., when demand distribution parameters are not perfectly known
a priori). Thus, revenue can still be improved signicantly via the utilization of the
exible capacity in the system, due to the ability to incorporate the more accurate
and detailed demand forecasts available in this stage. In this research, we refer to
the limited swapping of aircraft within one family based on updated demand forecasts
as the Demand Driven Swapping (DDS) problem. This problem is the focus of this
thesis.
The next section presents our proposed research directions.
1.2 Research Questions
To summarize, the value of the DDS (Demand Driven Swapping) approach lies in the
ability to postpone certain parts of the initial eeting decision, through the utilization
of dynamic swaps within each family, to a later point in time, when more accurate
demand information is available. This added exibility provides an increased ability
to hedge against the DOW variation, demand variation around its mean on any
particular day, and demand forecast errors. In this research, we focus on one of these
eects, demand variation around its mean on a particular day.
Clearly, the swapping criteria, frequency, and timing will have a signicant impact
on its benets. Swapping decisions that are made several weeks prior to departure
(i.e., 4-6 weeks out) will not cause much disturbance to operations, but will be based
on more uncertain demand. On the other hand, delaying (or revising) the swapping
decision until demand uncertainty is greatly resolved (i.e., 1-3 weeks out), will benet
from having improved demand information, thus reducing the possibility of \bad"
swaps (swaps with loss), but at a possibly larger cost of disrupting operations. In
addition, if the swapping decision is made too late, some customers may have already7
been rejected due to capacity restrictions. Thus, in the case of delayed swaps, it is
crucial to perform the revenue management study while considering the possibility
of subsequent swaps, instead of simply using xed capacities. As a result of the
foregoing trade-o, delayed swapping decisions will, probably, be made only for a set
of \critical" legs. In addition, since each swap is limited within aircraft types of the
same family, there will be high dependency between the initial eeting solution and
the DDS problem.
In this research, our focus will be on the following research questions: How should
we manage the exible capacity in the system (obtained by the later swapping ca-
pability) to hedge against the demand variation around its mean? When should
these swaps be performed? What is the value of more information on the swapping
decision?
In our late DDS implementation stage, swaps that are most likely to be performed
on a daily basis will be simple swaps, assigned to aircraft types within the same fam-
ily. Thus, our research plan will be to consider simple \swappable loops", which are
associated with a set of round-trips originating and ending at a common hub airport
with similar departure and arrival times so that they can be swapped without vio-
lating the ow balance in the ight network. Our objective is to study the impact
of demand characteristics (mean and variance of demand on a particular day) on the
benets of swapping. Thus, we will also consider that initial demand forecasts are
accurate (i.e., mean and variance of ight demands are known with certainty at the
outset). Although this assumption is not realistic, it is necessary to extract the pure
benets of demand characteristics on the benets of swapping. Specically, we will
study various swapping strategies, considering loops having dierent demand charac-
teristics. To achieve our goals, we will (1) develop stylized analytical models to gain
insights into the eectiveness of dierent swapping strategies, and (2) create simula-8
tion environments to test the validity of the insights gained through the mathematical
models as well as analyze more complex strategies.
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present a very brief overview
of the related literature on decision postponement strategies in manufacturing and
service industries. Chapter 3 introduces our model, assumptions, and the notation
that will be used throughout the thesis as well as some preliminary analysis and
derivations that will be utilized when studying more complex models in Chapter
4. Chapters 4 and 5 then present a comprehensive analysis of dierent swapping
strategies under dierent assumptions. Finally, we conclude, in Chapter 6, with a
discussion of our results and future research directions. All derivations are included
in the Appendix.Chapter 2
Literature Review
The Demand Driven Swapping (DDS) approach presented in this thesis represents
a systematic decision postponement strategy that benets from the utilization of the
partial exible capacity in the system, which refers to the ability to revise the eeting
decision as departures approach and more information on demand is gathered. In our
late DDS implementation stage, swaps that are most likely to be performed on a daily
basis will be simple loop swaps, assigned to aircraft types of the same family. Recall
that the latter restriction is due to the need to preserve the initial crew schedule.
Thus, the potential DDS swaps in this stage will be entirely determined by how the
exible capacity (i.e., aircraft types within each family) in the system is assigned to
swappable loops in the ight network. Thus, there will be high dependency between
the initial eeting assignment and the later swapping capability. As a result, we limit
our review of literature to two main areas: (1) Decision postponement strategies
and the value of information in manufacturing and service industries; and (2) airline
eeting, re-eeting, and swapping problems. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 provide a very brief
overview of research in each of these areas.
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2.1 An Overview of Decision Postponement Strate-
gies in Manufacturing and Service Industries
The main value of decision postponement strategies lies in the ability to delay some
portion of the tactical and operational decisions to a time when more information
on demand patterns is gathered and demand uncertainty is reduced. The literature
on decision postponement strategies, and especially on the value of information in
managing the supply chain, has grown signicantly in the last decade. However,
most of this research has focused on manufacturing and other service industries, but
not the airline industry. Thus, much research is still needed to study the value of
a systematic decision postponement approach, along with the strategies that can be
used to eectively manage supply, in the airline industry. In what follows, we present
a very brief overview of research in this area and give some examples to illustrate
the dierent decision postponement strategies possible in dierent environments. We
refer the interested reader to Tayur, Ganeshan, and Magazine (2000) for an extensive
review.
Delayed product dierentiation is one of the most commonly used decision post-
ponement strategies in manufacturing environments (see, for instance, Aviv and Fed-
ergruen, 2000, for an extensive review of research on these strategies). The underlying
idea is to delay the point a semi-nished product is dierentiated into its end-products
via a re-design of the manufacturing process so as to manage the risks associated with
product variety and demand uncertainty. The success of this strategy is due to sta-
tistical pooling eects and improved demand forecasts. Clearly, this strategy is most
benecial to implement for a product family, whose end-products share a high level
of commonality, while having highly variable demand patterns; see, for instance Aviv
and Federgruen (2001a, 2001b); Gavirneni and Tayur (2000); Swamanithan and Tayur11
(2000); and the references cited therein, as well as several researchers in the market-
ing literature, including Alderson (1950), who rst introduced the idea; and Cox and
Goodman (1956). A similar idea can be used in the transshipment of goods from
manufacturers to the retailers. A commonly used strategy that makes use of this idea
is the delayed geographic dierentiation strategy, which involves coordinating several
outlets through a regional distribution center, thus delaying the time shipments are
made to the outlets (Aviv and Federgruen, 2000).
Similar ideas can be benecial when implemented in manufacturing industries,
where capacity investment decisions are capital intensive and need to be made long be-
fore production starts, with limited information on future demand patterns. Although
it might be possible to update the initial capacity investment levels in the production
stage in such environments, investment costs will generally be much higher and lead
times of installing additional capacity will be very long. Consequently, decision post-
ponement strategies that can reduce the sensitivity of the initial capacity investment
decisions to demand uncertainty will incur large benets. The decision postponement
strategies considered in van Mieghem and Dada (1999) include price and production
postponement strategies in a single product environment. They show, through an
analytical model, that price postponement strategies make the capacity investment
and production (inventory) decisions more insensitive to uncertainty. Hence, such
postponement strategies can be valuable options to the rm. A related area is in-
vestments in exible manufacturing capacity, which provides the ability to delay the
allocation of the total production capacity to dierent product demands to a later
period in time, when demand uncertainty is greatly resolved (see, for instance, Biller,
Bish, and Muriel, 2000; Bish, Muriel, and Biller, 2001; Netessine, Dobson, and Shum-
sky, 2000; van Mieghem, 1999; and the references therein). In the same vein, several
researchers have studied the impact of demand information on inventory levels (see12
Anand, 2000, for an extensive review), and on variability in the supply chain (see
Chen et al., 2000; Gavirneni and Tayur, 2000, for extensive reviews). The value of
information is also studied in the context of supply contracts in a supply chain, where
a buyer and a supplier need to specify dierent levels of commitments for nancial,
material, and information ows under uncertainty (see Tsay, Nahmias, and Agrawal,
2000, for an extensive review on supply contracts).
To our knowledge, research that focuses on decision postponement strategies and
studies their benets considering the airline industry is extremely limited. Next, we
present a brief overview of research on airline eeting decisions.
2.2 Fleeting, Re-eeting, and Swapping Models in
Airline Supply Management
In this section, we summarize approaches used for airline eeting, re-eeting, and
swapping. Please refer to Zhu (2001) for an extensive literature review. Although the
focus of this research is not on the eeting problem, our DDS implementation will be
highly impacted by the initial eeting solution. In the following, we start with a very
brief overview of the eet assignment process, discuss its major short-comings, and
then present the literature on airline re-eeting and swapping strategies.
Since the eet assignment problem (FAP) is a major component of the airline
scheduling process, it has been extensively studied by researchers and practitioners
(see Gopalan and Talluri, 1998; Yu and Yang, 1998; and Zhu, 2001, for extensive
reviews). Most researchers have used the \same-every-day model" (i.e., the same eet
assignments are used every day of the planning period) for the FAP. This is mainly
due to the need to limit the size of the resulting problem, and thus the computational13
requirements, to a manageable level. Formulating the FAP as an integer program,
researchers have developed a variety of solution approaches to obtain good eeting
solutions in reasonable computing times (see, for instance, Abara, 1989; Daskin and
Panayotopoulos, 1989; Gu et al., 1994; Hane et al., 1995; Rushmeier and Kontogiorgis,
1997; Yan and Young, 1996; and the references cited therein). All these eeting
models are based on integer programming formulations, which consider three main
sets of basic constraints: (1) cover constraints, which require each ight leg to be
assigned to exactly one aircraft type; (2) balance constraints, which ensure that ow
in and out of each airport in the network is balanced; and (3) count constraints, which
ensure that the number of each aircraft type used in the eeting solution does not
exceed the number of that type available in the airline's eet. In addition, most of
these formulations incorporate leg demand versus aircraft capacity information only
through the use of suitable cost terms in the objective function. Several extensions
to the FAP have also been studied, such as including aggregate aircraft maintenance
considerations (Clarke et al., 1996; Subramanian et al., 1994); combining aircraft
eeting and routing (Barnhart et al., 1998; Desaulniers et al., 1997); and allowing
for ight departure times to vary within a small time-window so that more choices
of assigning aircraft to legs are possible (Rexing et al., 2000). Not surprisingly, the
problem size grows considerably with each enhancement, and the problem becomes
more dicult to solve to optimality.
As discussed in the previous chapter, most of these eet assignment models con-
sider the demand distribution information only via suitable cost terms in the objective
function, determined several months prior to departures, and the demand distribu-
tions considered are aggregated over the planning horizon. However, demand forecasts
at the time the eet assignment problem is solved (usually 8-12 weeks in advance of
departures) are not very reliable, but the forecast accuracy improves markedly over14
time. Consequently, a re-eeting or a swapping model that makes use of a more ac-
curate and detailed demand information that these eeting models lack can provide
signicant revenue impact to airline companies. We note here that a \systematic sup-
ply management strategy" (i.e., systematically revising eeting decisions over time
so as to incorporate the improved demand forecasts into the eeting decisions), as in
Sherali, Bish, and Zhu, 2001, requires solving the initial eeting problem considering
the dependencies between the initial eeting and the later re-eeting and/or swapping
problems. However, such an approach has not been addressed at all in these eeting
models and in the re-eeting literature cited below. All eeting models are solved
to obtain a \xed" eeting solution, whereas the re-eeting models are solved rather
sporadically. In fact, to our knowledge, research that focuses on these interactions to
propose an overall supply management scheme for airlines is nonexistent.
Research in the re-eeting area is relatively new and limited, and has mostly fo-
cused on recovery from irregular operations (see, for instance, Jarrah et al., 1993;
Thengwall et al., 2000; Yu and Luo, 1997). Berge and Hopperstad (1993) are one
of the rst researchers to study the benets of systematically revising eet assign-
ments over time, due to demand-capacity mismatches, as ight departures approach
and forecasts improve. Their proposed model consists of solving the eet assign-
ment model at the beginning of each period, based on updated demand information.
Heuristics are proposed to solve the eet assignment problem, which is formulated
as a multi-commodity network problem. After aircraft types are assigned to legs in
the ight network, simulation is performed to generate leg demands based on the
demand forecasts, and to estimate the resulting loads, spill (customers rejected due
to capacity restrictions), and the revenue. At the beginning of the next period, the
assignment costs for each (aircraft type-demand leg) pair are updated and this pro-
cess is repeated. Their computational study, based on real airline data, suggests that15
the proposed approach can improve the prot by 1-5%.
More recently, Jarrah et al. (2000) present a re-eeting model, having side con-
straints added to model the maintenance opportunities, crew stang levels, and noise
restrictions, together with a user specied parameter on the maximum number of
changes that can be made to the current schedule. The focus of Jarrah et al. is
on generating several near-optimal solutions so that the user can select the most
\appropriate" solution based on an operational perspective.
Talluri (1996) develops algorithms to modify the initial eet assignment solution,
when two aircraft types need to be swapped between a pair of airports. The algorithms
proposed by Talluri are based on a series of shortest-path algorithms, which minimize
the number of changes to the initial eeting solution, but are limited to two aircraft
types. Ahuja (2000) also focuses on algorithmic developments to swap aircraft, but
in his approach the swapping problem needs to be solved just after the initial eet
assignment phase so as to perform swaps such that a set of ight legs can be assigned to
the same aircraft type (i.e., through ights are formed), if possible. While both of these
papers and our proposed research focus on the aircraft swapping stage, the research
objectives are totally dierent. Talluri and Ahuja focus on algorithmic developments
to update the initial eet assignment solution so as to swap aircraft. On the contrary,
while focusing on simple loop swaps, where the eet assignment solution after the swap
can be easily obtained, our objective is to understand how to manage the swappable
capacity in the system.
Although some airlines have been using re-eeting models in the earlier stages
(i.e., to react to changes in assumptions and to manage the demand versus capacity
discrepancies), to our knowledge there is no major US airline that is managing its
supply through a systematic manipulation of the exible capacity in the system to
its full extent. However, several airlines are in the process of evaluating the benets16
of such an approach. Two examples include United Airlines and Continental Air-
lines. A preliminary simulation study performed by United Airlines exhibited high
benets as a result of managing supply by taking advantage of this exible capacity.
Similarly, Continental Airlines has been implementing a pilot study to test the ben-
ets of a demand driven swapping approach (see Pastor, 1999). In their pilot study,
Continental Airlines makes use of two types of swaps: 60 DTD (Days to Departure)
swaps and 14 DTD swaps. The former causes less disruptions to operations, because
the swap is performed before most airport services and operations are scheduled. At
this time, changes to the crew schedule are allowed at Continental Airlines. Thus,
the swap might involve aircraft types of dierent families. On the other hand, the 14
DTD swaps are restricted within each family due to the need to preserve the crew
schedule. However, the swaps are based on more accurate demand forecasts, since
the swap decision is made closer to departures. In a simulation study, they rst
use the expectation of revenue gain in the swapping decision. The simulation study
shows that while most swaps performed under this rule turn out to be successful,
there might be some bad swaps resulting in loss. In order to remedy this situation,
information on the probability distribution of the revenue gain, including its standard
deviation, minimum, maximum, and average, as well as the percentage of simulation
trials that achieve positive revenue gain and the percentage that meet the minimum
revenue goal, is used in the swapping decision. For a given swap possibility, all these
performance measures are estimated via simulation. For example, when the decision
rule is such that the swap is performed only when at least 80% of the simulation trials
meet the minimum revenue goal, the revenue is improved by 8%, while the number of
unprotable swaps are reduced over the policy using only the expected revenue gain
in the swapping decision.
Other examples of airline companies that make use of systematic swapping ap-17
proaches include Austrian Airlines and KLM. However, both of these airline compa-
nies make use of limited swaps in a very constrained way (swaps are performed 6-8
weeks out in Austrian Airlines and 2-4 weeks out in KLM; the process is manual in
both airlines; see Barocio-Cots, 1999; Berge and Hopperstad, 1993).Chapter 3
Model, Notation, and Preliminaries
3.1 Research Objectives
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the frequency and timing of the swaps in the DDS stage
will highly impact their revenue benets. Swapping decisions that are made several
weeks prior to departures (i.e., 4-6 weeks out) will not cause much disturbance to
operations, but will be based on limited demand information. On the other hand,
delaying the swapping decision to a time when the demand uncertainty is greatly
resolved (i.e., 1-3 weeks out) or revising the swapping decision later will benet from
the consideration of the most up-to-date demand information, thus resulting in more
protable and less risky swaps, but at a larger cost of disrupting operations. In
addition, if the swapping decision is made too late, some customers may have already
been rejected due to capacity restrictions. Thus, in the case of a delayed swapping
strategy, the swap potential needs to be considered when passengers, arriving over
time, are accepted or rejected from their requested ights. This, however, requires
the consideration of the swap potential in the revenue management process.
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Airline revenue management is based on segmenting the market by oering mul-
tiple \fare-classes" on each ight leg (an average of 5 fare-classes per leg is oered
by United Airlines): each fare-class corresponds to a dierent (fare, restriction) com-
bination. For example, a Y fare-class does not impose any restrictions (i.e., it can
be cancelled anytime after purchase with full refund), is oered at a higher price,
and is aimed towards capturing the business passengers, whereas a W fare-class is
more restricted (i.e., it should be purchased usually two weeks in advance of depar-
tures), and is oered at lower prices, so as to attract vacation passengers. Thus, a
delayed swapping strategy needs to be integrated within the revenue management
process. In addition, as mentioned above, a delayed swapping strategy might require
the re-scheduling of airport services and operations. Consequently, a delayed swap-
ping strategy is more dicult to implement in practice, and thus, such strategies need
to be limited to a set of \critical" legs, which would benet most from the potential
to revise/modify the swapping decision. On the other hand, swaps carried out under
limited demand information will be \risky" swaps, having the possibility of leading to
losses, due to the inability to react to updates on demand information. In addition,
since each swap is limited within aircraft types of the same family, there will be high
dependency between the initial eeting solution and the DDS problem.
Consequently, our objective in this thesis is to study important research questions
How should we manage the exible capacity in the system, obtained by utilizing the
capability to swap aircraft types, within each family, as departures approach? What
is the value of more information on the swapping decision? Can we identify a set of
\critical" legs that would benet most from a delayed swapping strategy?
Thus, these research questions attempt to explore the benets of dierent swap-
ping mechanisms. Our objectives are thus (1) to analyze the trade-o between better
information (i.e., a delayed swapping versus an early swapping) and higher disrup-20
tion costs to operations and the possibility of customers being rejected prior to the
swapping decision; and (2) to analyze how demand characteristics aect the benets
of swapping. Our research methodology will consist of studying stylized analytical
models to gain insights into these eects; and creating simulation environments to
test the validity of the insights gained through the mathematical models as well as an-
alyze more complex strategies and assess the dynamic performance of these strategies
when several model assumptions are relaxed.
First, we develop simple analytical models to study the eectiveness of dierent
swapping strategies, characterized in terms of their timing and frequency, while con-
sidering legs with dierent demand parameters. Our focus in this thesis is limited to
the benets of swapping to hedge against the variation in demand around its mean on
a particular day, and the capacity-demand discrepancies on each leg. Then, we extend
our analysis and understanding to more general cases through the use of simulation
models that relax several assumptions used in the analytical study.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we present the model
and the notation that will be used throughout this thesis. Then, in Sections 3.4
and 3.5, we present some preliminary analysis, which will be used as the building
blocks when we analyze more complicated models in the subsequent chapters.
3.2 Model and Assumptions
To gain insights into our research questions, we rst study a simple analytical model
that considers a pair of routes, swappable with each other (routes originating and
terminating at a common airport within similar time frames so that the aircraft
assigned to those routes can be swapped with each other, if needed), and having been
assigned two swappable aircraft types (of the same family), with respective capacities21
of C1 and C2 passengers (C1 < C2), in the initial eeting solution. We study the
eectiveness of several swapping strategies, characterized by their timing (i.e., when
the swapping decision is made), and frequency (i.e., how often the swapping decision is
revised). Two types of swapping strategies are considered: (1) Incomplete information
swapping strategies that are allowed to revise the swapping decision only a limited
number of times until departures, under incomplete information on demand; and
(2) Perfect information swapping strategies that make the swapping decision under
perfect information on demand. Although perfect information swapping policies are
not realistic, they provide an upper bound on the possible benets of swapping, and
are thus useful to analyze and compare with the former ones. Thus, the former are
used to hedge against both demand uncertainty and demand-capacity discrepancies,
whereas the latter allows us to single out the eectiveness of exibility to hedge
against demand-capacity discrepancies in the absence of demand uncertainty, since
the swapping decision is made under perfect information on demand. Comparing the
two, we can understand the additional benets that can be realized by having the
ability to revise the swapping decision later on, under reduced uncertainty. In the
following, we let t denote the number of periods until departures (i.e., the number of
periods \to go"). That is, departures occur at time 0.
Although many swapping strategies are possible, we focus on the following set of
policies, since they are easy to implement in practice, and also these policies represent
extreme cases that can help develop insights. Specically, we analyze the following
swapping strategies in our DDS model.
Incomplete Information Swapping Strategies:
 Limited Swapping Strategy (\Limited"): Under the limited swapping strat-
egy, swapping decision is made T periods before departures, under limited infor-22
mation on demand, and is not revised later, in order not to disrupt operations.
Consequently, swaps performed under this strategy can be \risky"; that is, they
may lead to loss.
 Delayed Swapping Strategy (\Delayed"): Under the delayed swapping strat-
egy, swapping decision is made T periods before departures, under limited in-
formation on demand, but can be revised later, at the beginning of each period
t, t = T   1;T   2; ;2;1, until departures, at the cost of disruptions to
operations.
Under incomplete information, swapping decisions can be made based on various
measures of merit, including the expected revenue gain of the swap, the probabil-
ity that the revenue gain is positive, and/or incorporating the variance of gain into
the decision. In our models, we consider that under both the limited and delayed
strategies, the swapping decision is made based only on the expected revenue gain of
the swap. It is a future research direction to incorporate other merits into our analysis.
Perfect Information Swapping Strategies:
 Perfect Information Swapping Strategy (\Perfect"): Under the perfect
information swapping strategy, we assume that swapping decision is made under
perfect information on demands.
Although the perfect information strategy is not realistic, it provides an upper bound
on the revenue benets possible under any swapping policy, and is needed to extract
the value of information in our swapping decision.
As stated above, each of these policies is attractive in practice for dierent rea-
sons: Limited swapping strategies do not cause much disturbance to operations, but23
carry a higher risk, since the decision is made under high demand uncertainty. On
the other hand, delayed information strategies might lead to the re-scheduling of sev-
eral airport and service operations, but will yield higher revenue gains. Thus, this
trade-o needs to be considered when determining a swapping policy. Of course many
other swapping strategies can be devised, each with dierent timing, frequency, and
decision criteria. However, since the limited, delayed, and perfect information swap-
ping strategies represent extreme cases (in the rst one, swapping decision is made
only once, under high demand uncertainty, and is not revised later; in the second
one, swapping decision is revised every period; and in the last one, the decision is
made under no demand uncertainty), insights developed for these strategies should
be useful for developing other strategies that are combinations of these.
As stated above, although delayed swapping strategies are attractive in reducing
the riskiness of the swaps, they face several problems in practice. First, it is costly and
undesirable to reschedule airport and service opertations, including cargo and food
catering. As an example, consider the cargo planning process. If passenger aircraft
is used for cargo transportation, which is the case for our industry partner, then
changes in aircraft capacity (and hence, its cargo capacity) would require changes in
the cargo schedule as well. Secondly, it may not be possible to swap aircraft at a
time closer to departures, if the number of accepted ticketed customers has already
exceeded the capacity of the smaller aircraft. This is due to the constraint that does
not allow spilling of any ticketed customers. Indeed, in our analysis,(see Chapter 4),
we found that delayed strategy cannot perform many swaps when the time gets closer
to departures.
Next, we describe the sequence of events in our model.
1. We are given the initial capacity assignments, of C1 and C2, for the two swap-
pable loops;24
2. T time periods before departures, we make our swapping decision (under both
limited and delayed strategies) based on the expected revenue gain of the swap,
determined using the current demand forecasts; and swap aircraft, if benecial
(i.e., if the expected revenue gain is positive);
3. At the beginning of each period t, t = T   1; ;2;1, we update our demand
forecasts based on the demand realizations in periods t + 1; ;T. Under
the delayed strategy, we then re-evaluate our swapping decision based on the
expected revenue gain corresponding to the updated demand forecasts; and
revise our swapping decision, if needed. Demand is realized in period t;
4. Demand in the last period (period 1) is realized and the resulting revenue gain or
loss (over the \base case", which does not involve any DDS swapping) is deter-
mined under the limited, delayed, and perfect information swapping strategies.
Recall that under the perfect information swapping strategy, swapping decision will
simply be made based on the overall demand realized on each leg at departures, and
revenue will be determined assuming that no demand will be lost due to the delayed
timing of the swapping decision. This will be detailed in Section 3.4.
We assume that the total demand observed on any leg initially assigned to the
larger capacity, C2, up to time T is not larger than the smaller aircraft capacity, C1.
Thus, a swap at the beginning of time T is still possible, since it will not spill any
passengers already ticketed. This is a very reasonable assumption, especially when
considering domestic ights 4-6 weeks prior to departures, which is the time period
the swapping decision needs to be made under the limited swapping strategy. This
assumption will simplify the expressions for the limited swapping policy, but as will be
explained in Chapter 4, we will still consider that a revision to the swapping decision
under the delayed swapping strategy will not be made in time t, t = T   1; ;1 if25
the swap spills any ticketed passengers. Since the delayed swapping strategy makes
use of a number of revisions to the swapping decision until departures, we still need
to consider this possibility.
Recall that our research objective is to study the eectiveness of dierent swapping
strategies to hedge against the variation around mean demand and demand-capacity
discrepancies in the swappable routes, so that we can devise eective swapping strate-
gies based on demand characteristics.Consequently, we make certain assumptions that
allow us to isolate the pure eect of these demand characteristics on the benets of
swapping. Specically, we assume that there is no demand forecast error (i.e., all
parameters of the demand distributions are known with certainty at the outset). It
is an interesting future research direction to incorporate the eect of forecast error in
our analysis. We rst consider a single fare-class (class) on each leg in our analytical
models. Then, we will extend our model to multiple fare-classes through a simulation
model in Chapter 5.
In the following section, we present the notation that will be used throughout this
thesis.
3.3 Notation
We let Li denote the set of legs in the swappable routes, assigned to aircraft having
capacity Ci in the initial eeting solution, for i = 1;2, where L1 = fl1;l2; ;ln1g and
L2 = fk1;k2; ;kn2g, and let L = L1 [ L2. Thus, if a swap is made, then aircraft
having capacity C2 will be assigned to legs in set L1, and aircraft having capacity C1
to legs in set L2. In what follows, we consider, without loss of generality, that n1 =
n2 = n. However, all our expressions can be extended to the case with n1 6= n2. We26
let Cmid =
C1+C2
2 .
As stated in the previous section, we rst study a model, considering a single
fare-class (also equivalent to a multiple fare-class model under some restrictive as-
sumptions). We let Di denote the demand on ight leg i, i 2 L, which is a random
variable. In this thesis, we consider that each demand Di is independently, normally
distributed with mean i, standard deviation i, probability density function (pdf)
fi(:) and cumulative distribution function (CDF) Fi(:). Observe that the normal de-
mand distribution considered represents a continuous approximation of the discrete
demand. A normal distribution approximation has been widely used in the litera-
ture to represent airline demand as well as demand in more general settings (see,
for instance, Barocio-Cots, 1999; Kniker, 1999; and the references cited therein). In
addition, our airline partner has been modeling leg demands using the normal distri-
bution. This is because it is possible to specify the rst two moments of the random
variable under the normal distribution, and the normal distribution lends itself to
analytical tractability. In addition, the probability of negative values in this normal
distribution is assumed to be negligible. In our analysis, this is justied for demand
coecient of variations (c.v.),
i
i, of at most 0:30, which are typical for the variability
in demand on a particular day observed in the airline industry in this time period
(4-6 weeks out).
We let Dit denote the demand on leg i in period t, which is also assumed to
be normally distributed with mean it and standard deviation it, for i 2 L; t =
1;2; ;T. We assume that demand on each leg is independent across periods, and
also between legs. These assumptions, also used in the demand forecasting system
of our industrial partner, allow us to express Di as
PT
t=1 Dit, where i =
PT
t=1 it
and 2
i =
PT
t=1 2
it, for i 2 L. Similarly, Dc
it denotes the cumulative demand (demand
to go) on leg i in periods t;t   1; ;1; that is, Dc
it =
Pt
j=1 Dij, which then is27
also normally distributed with parameters c
it =
Pt
j=1 ij and (c
it)2 =
Pt
j=1 2
ij, for
i 2 L; t = 1; ;T. We let dit represent the demand realized (observed) on ight leg
i in period t, for i 2 L;t = 1; ;T. In the delayed swapping strategy, we update
demand forecasts at the beginning of each period as demands are realized. This is
detailed below.
We let ~ Dc
it denote the cumulative demand forecast on leg i, updated at the begin-
ning of period t, based on demand realizations in periods t + 1; ;T. The mean,
~ c
it, and standard deviation, ~ c
it, of the random variable ~ Dc
it are updated as follows:
~ 
c
it =
T X
j=t+1
dij +
t X
j=1
ij
(~ 
c
it)
2 =
t X
j=1

2
ij
Thus, ~ Dc
it is normally distributed with ~ c
it and (~ c
it)2 for i 2 L, t = 1; ;T   1.
Finally, for each i 2 L, we dene the following disjoint events: si = fDi <
C1g; bi = fC1 < Di < C2g; gi = fDi > C2g. Thus, we can write:
Pr(si) = Fi(C1); Pr(bi) = Fi(C2)   Fi(C1); Pr(gi) = 1   Fi(C2):
where Fi(Cj) is an accumulative demand distribution function of leg i up to capacity
Cj.
For random variable X having mean X and standard deviation X, we dene
eX(x)  exp(
 (x X)2
22
X ); x+  maxfx;0g and x   minfx;0g. We let E(X) and
V ar(X) denote the expectation and variance of X that is, E(X) = X and V ar(X) =
2
X. Throughout, lower-case letters represent realizations of the random variables,
whereas capital letters represent the random variables.
In the following, we use superscripts P, D, and L to denote the perfect infor-
mation (\perfect"), delayed (\delayed"), and limited (\limited") swapping strategies,28
respectively. We let GP;GD and GL respectively denote the revenue gains under
swapping strategies perfect, delayed, and limited. Clearly, E[GL]  E[GD]  E[GP].
As mentioned above, in order to extract the pure impact of demand characteristics
(variation around mean on a particular day and demand-capacity discrepancies) on
the revenue gains of the dierent swapping policies, we consider the same fare on each
leg in the swappable routes, and focus on the following performance measures: (1)
how the expected gain and the variability in gain dier under these three strategies;
(2) the proportion of time the gain of perfect is higher than those of delayed and lim-
ited, and (3) the proportion of time the gain of delayed is higher than that of limited.
As the following, we derive analytical expressions for the revenue gains under the
perfect information and limited swapping strategies, and study the delayed swapping
strategy through a simulation model in Section 4.2.2.
3.4 Deriving Expressions for the Perfect Informa-
tion and Limited Swapping Strategies
As dened above, L1 and L2 respectively denote the set of legs assigned to capacities
C1 and C2 in the initial eeting solution; and L = L1 [L2. For each i 2 L, we dene
the random variable i  minfDi;C2g minfDi;C1g. Thus, for each i 2 L1, revenue
contribution of leg i to the swap is +i, and for each j 2 L2, its revenue contribution
is  j. Hence, we can write,
G
P = maxf
X
i2L1
i  
X
j2L2
j;0g
G
L =
8
> <
> :
P
i2L1 i  
P
j2L2 j; if swapped in period T;
0; otherwise:
(3.1)29
As previously stated, the revenue gain under the perfect information strategy provides
an upper bound on the gain possible under any swapping strategy, since it increases
revenue by eliminating all bad swaps by utilizing the perfect information on demands.
We let G 
P
i2L1 i  
P
j2L2 j and let q denote a binary decision variable,
which is 1, if a swap decision is made under the limited swapping strategy in period
T; and 0, otherwise. Thus, due to our decision criteria used in the limited swapping
strategy, we can write:
q =
8
> <
> :
1; if E[G] > 0 in period T;
0; otherwise:
Next we dene random variables !ij = i   j, for each i 2 L1;j 2 L2. Recall that
jL1j = jL2j = n Thus, L1 = fl1; ;lng and L2 = fk1; ;kng. Hence, we write:
E[G
L] = max fE[
n X
i=1
!liki]; 0g  E[G
P] = E[ max f
n X
i=1
!liki; 0g]

n X
i=1
E[ maxf!liki; 0g]
=
n X
i=1
E[!
+
liki] (3.2)
In the following, we will determine analytical expressions for the expectation and
variance of random variable GL. However, determining the expectation and variance
of random variable GP gets analytically messy. Therefore, in our analysis we will make
use of the upper bound on E[GP], derived in Equation (3.2). Our computational study
indicates that this is a strong upper bound; see Chapter 4.
Consider the case when a swap is made under the limited strategy. Then, only
when the realized gain is negative (i.e., the swap actually leads to a loss), the gain
under the limited and perfect information strategies will be dierent, since perfect30
information strategy will eliminate all swaps with loss. On the other hand, if a swap
is not made under the limited strategy, then whenever the realized gain is positive,
this gain will be realized only under the perfect information strategy, but not under
the limited strategy. Thus, we can write:
E[G
P   G
L] =
8
> <
> :
 E[minf
Pn
i=1 !liki; 0g ] =  E[
Pn
i=1 !
 
liki]; if q = 1
E[maxf
Pn
i=1 !liki; 0g ] = E[
Pn
i=1 !
+
liki]; otherwise
(3.3)
Pr[G
P > G
L] =
8
> <
> :
Pr(
Pn
i=1 !liki < 0); if q = 1
Pr(
Pn
i=1 !liki > 0); otherwise.
(3.4)
Next, we derive exact expressions as well as bounds on the expectation and variance of
random variables GL and GP as well as their dierence. The remainder of this chapter
focuses on fundamentals that will be used in these derivations in the subsequent
chapters.
3.5 Preliminaries
3.5.1 Derivations of Some Basic Functions
We rst derive expressions for random variables !ij, i 2 L1;j 2 L2. Please refer to
the Appendix for all derivations in this section.31
!ij = i   j =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
0; if si;sj or gi;gj,
C1   Dj; if si;bj (!ij < 0);
C1   C2; if si;gj (!ij < 0);
Di   C1; if bi;sj (!ij > 0);
Di   Dj; if bi;bj;Di > Dj (!ij > 0);
Di   Dj; if bi;bj;Di < Dj (!ij < 0);
Di   C2; if bi;gj (!ij < 0);
C2   C1; if gi;sj (!ij > 0);
C2   Dj; if gi;bj (!ij > 0):
(3.5)
We can write:
p
+
ij  Pr(!ij > 0) = Prf(bi;sj) or (gi;sj) or (bi;bj;Di > Dj) or (gi;bj)g
= [Fj(C2)   Fj(C1)][1   Fi(C2)] + Fj(C1)[1   Fi(C2)] + Fj(C1)[Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)]
+
Z C2
C1
Z di
C1
fj(dj)fi(di)ddj ddi
= Fj(C2) [1   Fi(C2)] +
Z C2
C1
fi(d)Fj(d) dd (3.6)
p
 
ij  Pr(!ij < 0) = Prf(si;bj) or (bi;bj;Di < Dj) or (si;gj) or (bi;gj)g
= Fi(C1)[Fj(C2)   Fj(C1)] + Fi(C2)[1   Fj(C2)]
+
Z C2
C1
Z dj
C1
fi(di)fj(dj)ddi ddj
= Fi(C2)[1   Fj(C2)] +
Z C2
C1
fj(d)Fi(d) dd (3.7)
The expressions for the expectation and variance of random variables !
+
ij;i 232
L1;j 2 L2, can be derived as follows.
!
+
ij = maxf!ij;0g =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > :
Di   C1; if bi;sj
Di   Dj; if bi;bj;Di > Dj
C2   C1; if gi;sj
C2   Dj; if gi;bj
0; otherwise:
(3.8)
Hence,
E[!
+
ij] = E[!ijj!ij > 0] Pr[!ij > 0]
= E[Di   C1jbi;sj] Pr(bi;sj) + E[Di   Djjbi;bj;Di > Dj] Pr(bi;bj;Di > Dj)
+ E[C2   C1jgi;sj] Pr(gi;sj) + E[C2   Djjgi;bj] Pr(gi;bj)
= C2Fj(C2)[1   Fi(C2)]   C1Fj(C1)[1   Fi(C1)]
  j[Fj(C2)   Fj(C1)][1   Fi(C2)]   
2
j[fj(C1)   fj(C2)][1   Fi(C2)]
+ iFj(C1)[Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)] + 
2
i[fi(C1)   fi(C2)]Fj(C1)
+
Z C2
C1
Z C2
dj
(di   dj)fj(dj)fi(di) ddi ddj
= C2Fj(C2)[1   Fi(C2)]   C1Fj(C1)[1   Fi(C1)]
  j[Fj(C2)   Fj(C1)]   
2
j[fj(C1)   fj(C2)]
+ i[Fi(C2)Fj(C2)   Fi(C1)Fj(C1)] + 
2
i[fi(C1)Fj(C1)   fi(C2)Fj(C2)]
+ 
2
i
Z C2
C1
fi(d)fj(d) dd   i
Z C2
C1
fj(d)Fi(d) dd
+
Z C2
C1
d fj(d)Fi(d) dd (3.9)33
Similarly, we derive:
E[(!
+
ij)
2] = E[!
2
ijj!ij > 0] Pr[!ij > 0]
= E[(Di   C1)
2jbi;sj] Pr(bi;sj) + E[(Di   Dj)
2jbi;bj;Di > Dj] Pr(bi;bj;Di > Dj)
+ E[(C2   C1)
2jgi;sj] Pr(gi;sj) + E[(C2   Dj)
2jgi;bj] Pr(gi;bj)
= Fj(C1) [Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)] (
2
i + 
2
i)
+ Fj(C1)
2
i [ (C1 + i) fi(C1)   (C2 + i) fi(C2) ]
  2Fj(C1) [Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)] C1 i   2Fj(C1) C1 
2
i [fi(C1)   fi(C2)]
+ [1   Fi(C2)] [Fj(C2)   Fj(C1)] (
2
j + 
2
j)
+ [1   Fi(C2)] 
2
j [(C1 + j) fj(C1)   (C2 + j) fj(C2)]
  2[1   Fi(C2)] [Fj(C2)   Fj(C1)] C2 j   2[1   Fi(C2)] C2 
2
j [fj(C1)   fj(C2)]
+ C
2
1 Fj(C1) [1   Fi(C1)] + C
2
2 Fj(C2) [1   Fi(C2)]   2 C1 C2 Fj(C1) [1   Fi(C2)]
+
Z C2
C1
Z C2
dj
(d
2
i   2didj + d
2
j) fj(dj) fi(di) ddi ddj
We can now determine:
V ar(!
+
ij) = E[(!
+
ij)
2]   ( E[!
+
ij] )
2 (3.10)34
Similarly, we derive the expectation for !
 
ij = minf!ij;0g as:
E[!
 
ij] = E[!ijj!ij < 0] Pr[!ij < 0]
= Fi(C1)
Z C2
C1
(C1   d)fj(d) dd
+ (C1   C2)Fi(C1)[1   Fj(C2)] +
Z C2
C1
Z dj
C1
(di   dj)fj(dj)fi(di) ddi ddj
+ [1   Fj(C2)]
Z C2
C1
(d   C2)fi(d) dd
= C1 Fi(C1)[1   Fj(C1)]   C2 Fi(C2)[1   Fj(C2)]
+ i[Fi(C2)(1   Fj(C2))   Fi(C1)(1   Fj(C1)] + 
2
ifi(C1)[1   Fj(C1)]
  
2
ifi(C2)[1   Fj(C2)] + i
Z C2
C1
fj(d)Fi(d) dd
  
2
i
Z C2
C1
fi(d)fj(d) dd  
Z C2
C1
d fj(d)Fi(d) dd (3.11)
Finally, observe that E[!ij] = E[!
+
ij] + E[!
 
ij].
Next, we derive expressions for expectation and variance of random variables i,
i 2 L. Letting aki = minfCk;Dig, for k = 1;2, we can write E[aki] = Ck+Fi(Ck)(i 
Ck)   2
ifi(Ck). Thus:
E[i] = E[a2i   a1i]
= (C2   C1) + Fi(C2)(i   C2) + Fi(C1)(C1   i) + 
2
i[fi(C1)   fi(C2)]
(3.12)
Observe that
E[!ij] = E[i   j]
= Fi(C2)(i   C2) + Fi(C1)(C1   i) + 
2
i[fi(C1)   fi(C2)]
  Fj(C2)(j   C2)   Fj(C1)(C1   j)   
2
j[fj(C1)   fj(C2)] (3.13)35
Similarly, we write,
V ar(i) = V ar(a2i   a1i)
= E[(a2i   a1i)
2]   (E[a2i   a1i])
2 (3.14)
We start with the rst term. We can write E[(a2i a1i)2] = E[a2
2i]+E[a2
1i] 2E[a1i
a2i], where:
E[a1i  a2i] =(
2
i + 
2
i) Fi(C1)   
2
i (C1 + i)fi(C1) + C1i [Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)]
+ C1
2
i [fi(C1)   fi(C2)] + C1 C2 [1   Fi(C2)]
Similarly, for k = 1;2, we obtain:
E[a
2
ki] = (
2
i + 
2
i) Fi(Ck)   
2
i (Ck + i) fi(Ck) + C
2
k [1   Fi(Ck)]
Thus,
V ar(i) = (
2
i + 
2
i)[Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)] + 
2
i[(C1 + i)fi(C1)   (C2 + i)fi(C2)]
  2C1i[Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)]   2C1
2
i[fi(C1)   fi(C2)]
+ (C
2
2   2C1C2)[1   Fi(C2)] + C
2
1[1   Fi(C1)]
  f(C2   C1) + Fi(C2)(i   C2) + Fi(C1)(C1   i) + 
2
i[fi(C1)   fi(C2)]g
2
(3.15)
Thus, we can also obtain:
V ar(!ij) = V ar(i) + V ar(j) (3.16)
We will make use of these expressions in our analysis in the subsequent sections.
3.5.2 Analysis of Some Basic Functions
We start by considering only two legs, i 2 L1 and j 2 L2, in the swappable routes.
Thus, leg i is initially assigned to the smaller capacity C1, and leg j to the larger36
capacity C2. We assume, in this section, that swapping decisions under both perfect
information and limited swapping strategies are made based only on the expected
revenue gain of these two legs. We will relax this assumption in the next chapter,
when we study a more realistic model. If we let GP
ij and GL
ij respectively denote
the revenue gain component corresponding only to legs i and j under the perfect
information and limited swapping strategies, then we can write:
E[G
P
ij] = E[maxf!ij;0g] = E[!
+
ij]; E[G
L
ij] = maxfE[!ij];0g
Thus, the expected dierence in gain between the perfect and limited strategies corre-
sponding to leg pair (i;j), E[GP
ij GL
ij], the probability that the gain corresponding to
leg pair (i;j) under the perfect strategy is larger than that under the limited strategy,
Pr(GP
ij > GL
ij), and the variances of random variables GP
ij and GL
ij can be written as
follows:
E[G
P
ij   G
L
ij] =
8
> <
> :
 E[!
 
ij]; if q = 1
E[!
+
ij]; otherwise
(3.17)
Pr(G
P
ij > G
L
ij) =
8
> <
> :
Pr(!ij < 0) = p
 
ij; if q = 1
Pr(!ij > 0) = p
+
ij; otherwise
(3.18)
V ar(G
P
ij) = V ar(!
+
ij) (3.19)
V ar(G
L
ij) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
V ar(!ij); if q = 1
0; otherwise;
i
(3.20)
where
q =
8
> <
> :
1; if E[!ij] > 0
0 otherwise:37
Keeping all demand and capacity parameters, except for the mean demand on leg
i, constant, we can show that there exists a threshold value th
i such that if i  th
i ,
then we swap under the limited strategy (i.e., q = 1); and otherwise, we do not swap
(i.e., q = 0). This result is intuitive and directly follows from Result 3.5.1 below,
which shows that the function E[!ij] is non-decreasing in i. Thus, we can write:
E[G
P
ij   G
L
ij] =
8
> <
> :
E[!
+
ij]; if i < th
i
 E[!
 
ij]; if i  th
i
(3.21)
Pr(G
P
ij > G
L
ij) =
8
> <
> :
p
+
ij; if i < th
i
p
 
ij; if i  th
i :
(3.22)
In a similar way, we can show (see Result 3.5.2 in the next section) that keeping all
demand and capacity parameters, except for j, constant, there exists a threshold
value th
j such that if j  th
j , then we swap under the limited strategy (q = 1); and
otherwise, we do not swap (q = 0).
In Section 3.5.3, we study how functions E[!
+
ij];E[!
 
ij];E[!ij];V ar(!
+
ij), and V ar(!ij)
behave as demand parameters change so as to derive some insights. Then, in Sec-
tion 3.5.4, we extend this analysis to probability functions p
+
ij and p
 
ij. We will use
these results in the next chapter, when we compare the total gain functions cor-
responding to all legs of the swappable routes, under the perfect information and
limited swapping strategies.
3.5.3 Analysis of the Expectation and Variance Components
Corresponding to One Leg Pair
We rst study how functions E[!
+
ij], E[!
 
ij], and E[!ij] behave as the mean demand
on the leg initially assigned to the smaller capacity, i, increases. The following result38
characterizes their behaviors.
Result 3.5.1 Consider any leg i 2 L1 and j 2 L2. We have:
E[!
+
ij]
i
= Fi(C2)Fj(C2)   Fi(C1)Fj(C1)  
Z C2
C1
fj(d)Fi(d) dd  0
E[!
 
ij]
i
= Fi(C2)[1   Fj(C2)]   Fi(C1)[1   Fj(C1)] +
Z C2
C1
fj(d)Fi(d) dd  0
E[!ij]
i
= Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)  0;
2E[!ij]
2
i
= 
2
i [fi(C1)   fi(C2)]
Thus, E[!
+
ij], E[!
 
ij], and E[!ij] are non-decreasing in i.
Proof: We can write the following lower and upper bounds on
R C2
C1 fj(d)Fi(d) dd.
Fi(C1)
Z C2
C1
fj(d) dd 
Z C2
C1
fj(d)Fi(d) dd  Fi(C2)
Z C2
C1
fj(d) dd
) Fi(C1)[Fj(C2)   Fj(C1)] 
Z C2
C1
fj(d)Fi(d) dd  Fi(C2)[Fj(C2)   Fj(C1) (3.23)
Using the upper bound in Equation (3.23), we can thus write:
E[!
+
ij]
i
= Fi(C2)Fj(C2)   Fi(C1)Fj(C1)  
Z C2
C1
fj(d)Fi(d) dd
 Fj(C1)[Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)]  0
Similarly, using the lower bound in Equation (3.23), we can write:
E[!
 
ij]
i
= Fi(C2)[1   Fj(C2)]   Fi(C1)[1   Fj(C1)] +
Z C2
C1
fj(d)Fi(d) dd
 [Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)] [1   Fj(C2)]  0
The last two derivations are given in the Appendix. This completes the proof.
In addition, since C1 < C2, we have that for i  Cmid, fi(C1)  fi(C2), and
thus, E[!ij] is convex non-decreasing in i, whereas for i > Cmid, it is concave39
non-decreasing in i. Observe that this makes sense: As the mean demand on leg i
increases, the expected gain of swapping the capacity assigned to that leg (C1) with
a larger capacity (C2) also increases. However, as the mean demand on the leg gets
larger, the benets of assigning it a larger capacity will increase at a slower rate, since
even the larger capacity will not be able to capture all demand. Similarly, for small
values of i, the rate of increase of E[!ij] is very small, since almost all leg demand
can be captured by the smaller capacity C1. Thus, for very small or very large i
(i.e., i << C1 or i >> C2), the rate of increase of function E[!ij] approaches to 0.
Next, we evaluate these functions using numerical integration, considering pa-
rameters typical in practice. In all the following numerical integration analysis, we
consider two aircraft types of the Boeing 737 family, having capacities of C1 = 112
and C2 = 126 passengers. Thus, Cmid = 119. In addition, unless otherwise noted, we
consider i values of f15;25g and j value of 15.
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Figure 3.1: a)E[!
+
ij] versus i ; b) E[!
 
ij] versus i.40
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Figure 3.2: E[!
+
ij] versus i.
Figure 3.1 depicts how functions E[!
+
ij] and E[!
 
ij] behave as the mean demand
on leg i, i, increases, when considering j = 119. We observe the same behavior for
other j values. As Result 3.5.1 indicates, both E[!
+
ij] and E[!
 
ij] are non-decreasing
in i. Observing both graphs for i = 15 and 25, we see that for lower values of i
(i  Cmid = 119), higher demand variability is more desirable (i.e., both E[!
+
ij] and
E[!
 
ij] are larger in the i = 25 case than the i = 15 case for i values of up to
Cmid). On the other hand, for higher values of i (i  Cmid), lower variability leads
to higher values for both functions. This pattern can also be observed in Figure 3.2,
which plots E[!
+
ij] versus i for dierent i values, considering again, j = 119 and j
= 15. For i values of up to Cmid, E[!
+
ij] is increasing in i; otherwise, it is decreasing
in i. Finally, the rates of increase of both E[!
+
ij] and E[!
 
ij] decrease to zero as
i ! 1. Also observe that both functions are initially convex and become concave
at point i = Cmid.41
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Figure 3.3: a)E[GP
ij] and E[GL
ij] versus i; b) E[GP
ij   GL
ij] versus i.
Next we study how the expected dierence in gain under the perfect information
and limited swapping strategies changes as i increases. For this purpose, in Fig-42
ure 3.3(a), we plot functions E[GP
ij] and E[GL
ij], whereas in Figure 3.3(b), we plot the
expected dierence, E[GP
ij GL
ij], as i increases, considering i = 15 and 25, and j =
119. In order to interpret the results, we introduce the concept of demand imbalance
(ij), which we dene as ij  i  j. We will extend this term to consider the mul-
tiple legs in the swappable routes, when we study the total gain functions under the
limited and perfect information swapping strategies in Chapter 4. Clearly, the thresh-
old point, th
i , will be dierent for cases with dierent i values. However, for the i
= 15 and 25 cases considered in Figure 3.3(b), both threshold values turn out to be
equal. Observe that the region up to point th
i (i.e., ij  0) represents cases where no
swaps are made under the limited strategy; thus, its expected gain is zero. Similarly,
the region after point th
i (i.e., ij > 0) is the region where swaps are made under the
limited swapping strategy. Recall that the expected dierence, E[GP
ij  GL
ij], is given
by E[!
+
ij] up to the swapping point th
i , and is given by  E[!
 
ij] after the swapping
point; see Equation (3.21). Thus, Result 3.5.1 indicates that the expected dierence,
E[GP
ij  GL
ij], is non-decreasing in i up to the swapping point, and is non-increasing
in i after the swapping point. This pattern can be observed in Figure 3.3(b) for both
i = 15 and 25 cases. In addition, we have observed, in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, that
E[!
+
ij] is increasing in i up to the swapping point, and  E[!
 
ij] is also increasing in
i after the swapping point. Thus, the expected dierence, E[GP
ij  GL
ij] is increasing
in i, over the values evaluated in Figure 3.3(b).
In summary, as the absolute value of the demand imbalance (jijj) decreases and/or
demand standard deviation, i, increases, the additional expected gain that can be
achieved under the perfect information strategy over the limited swapping strategy in-
creases. We will observe the same behavior when we study the total gain functions
corresponding to multiple legs under the limited and perfect information strategies
in Chapter 4.43
Next we study how functions E[!
+
ij], E[!
 
ij], and E[!ij] behave as j, the mean
demand on the leg initially assigned to the larger capacity, increases.
Result 3.5.2 Consider any leg i 2 L1 and j 2 L2. We have:
E[!
+
ij]
j
= 
2
i[fi(C2)   fi(C1)]fj(C1) + C2Fi(C2)fj(C2)   C1Fi(C1)fj(C1)
+ i[Fi(C1)fj(C1)   Fi(C2)fj(C2)]   Fj(C1)   Fj(C2)
+
Z C2
C1
d
2
j
Fi(d)fj(d) dd +
2
i
2
j
Z C2
C1
(d   j)fi(d)fj(d) dd
+
j
2
j
Z C2
C1
(i   d)Fi(d)fj(d) dd +
1
2
j
Z C2
C1
d
2Fi(d)fj(d) dd
E[!
 
ij]
j
= C1Fi(C1)fj(C1)   C2Fi(C2)fj(C2)   i[Fi(C1)fj(C1)   Fi(C2)fj(C2)]
+ 
2
i[fi(C1)fj(C1)   fi(C2)fj(C2)] +
i
2
j
Z C2
C1
d Fi(d)fj(d) dd
 
2
i
2
j
Z C2
C1
d Fi(d)fj(d) dd  
1
2
j
Z C2
C1
d
2Fi(d)fj(d) dd  
ij
2
j
Z C2
C1
Fi(d)fj(d) dd
E[!ij]
j
= Fj(C1)   Fj(C2)  0;
2E[!ij]
2
j
=  
2
j [fj(C1)   fj(C2)]44
(a)                                     (b) 
1 0 0 1 2 0 1 4 0 1 6 0 1 8 0 2 0 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
E[wij
+
]
￿
j
__ : 
￿ j = 15 
--- : 
￿ j = 25
E[wij
-
]
￿
j 1 0 0 1 5 0 2 0 0 2 5 0 3 0 0
- 7
- 6
- 5
- 4
- 3
- 2
- 1
__ : 
￿ j = 15 
--- : 
￿ j = 25
Figure 3.4: a)E[!
+
ij] versus j; b) E[!
 
ij] versus j.
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Figure 3.5: E[!
+
ij] versus j.45
Figure 3.4 illustrates how functions E[!
+
ij] and E[!
 
ij] change as j increases,
considering i = 119, i = 15, and j = 15 and 25. We observe the same behavior for
other values of i. In case of a swap, the initial capacity (C2) on leg j, j 2 L2, will
be exchanged with the smaller capacity (C1). Thus, E[!
+
ij] and E[!
 
ij] are both non-
increasing in j, over the values evaluated in these graphs. Moreover, we observe that
for lower values of j, smaller demand standard deviation, j, leads to higher gain
(or lower loss), whereas for larger values of j, higher demand standard deviations
are preferable. This pattern can also be observed in Figure 3.5, which plots E[!
+
ij]
versus j for dierent values of j, considering again i = 119 and i = 15. For j
values of up to Cmid, E[!
+
ij] is decreasing in j; otherwise, it is increasing in j. As
j gets very large (i.e., j >> C2), the rates of decrease of both E[!
+
ij] and E[!
 
ij]
reduce to 0.
Result 3.5.2 also shows that function E[!ij] is non-increasing in j. Thus, there
exists a threshold value, th
j , such that if j  th
j , then we swap under the limited
strategy; and otherwise, we do not swap. Our numerical integration results, plotted
in Figure 3.6, illustrate how the expected dierence, E[GP
ij   GL
ij], changes as j
increases, considering i = 15, j = 15 and 25, and j = 119. Observe that function
E[GP
ij   GL
ij] behaves similarly as i increases or j increases; see Figures 3.3(b)
and 3.6(b).46
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Figure 3.6: a)E[GP
ij] and E[GL
ij] versus j; b) E[GP
ij]   E[GL
ij] versus j.
Next we characterize the behaviors of functions E[!
+
ij] and E[!ij] as the dierence
between aircraft capacities increases (i.e., C2 increases as C1 stays constant). We have
the following result.47
Result 3.5.3 Consider any leg i 2 L1 and j 2 L2. We have:
E[!
+
ij]
C2
= [1   Fi(C2)] Fj(C2)  0
E[!ij]
C2
= Fj(C2)   Fi(C2)
Since E[GP
ij] = E[!
+
ij], the expected gain component on leg pair (i;j) under the perfect
information swapping strategy is non-decreasing in C2. However, as C2 becomes very
large, its rate of change approaches zero. On the other hand, recall that E[GL
ij] =
maxfE[!ij];0g. Thus, the expected gain on leg pair (i;j) under the limited swapping
strategy is not necessarily non-decreasing in C2. Figure 3.7 depicts such a situation
with i = 112, i = 5, j = 119, j = 15; see Figure 3.7(a), where E[!ij] is rst
non-decreasing and then non-increasing as C2 increases. On the other hand, when i
= 128, i = 25, j = 119, j = 15, E[!ij] is non-decreasing in C2; see Figure 3.7(b).
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Figure 3.7: E[!ij] versus C2 for a) i = 112 and i = 5; b) i = 128 and i = 25.48
Next we study the impact of demand parameters on the variances of random
variables GP
ij and GL
ij, where V ar(GP
ij) = V ar(!
+
ij) and
V ar(G
P
ij) =
8
> <
> :
V ar(!ij); if q = 1
0; otherwise,
(3.24)
as given in Equations (3.19) and (3.20). Recall also that V ar(!ij) = V ar(i) +
V ar(j). Thus, we make use of Equations (3.10), (3.15), and ( 3.16), to evaluate
these functions, considering dierent demand parameters.
Figures 3.8(a) and (b) suggest that V ar(i) is unimodal in i: First it is non-
decreasing and then non-increasing in i, whereas it is non-decreasing in i over the
values evaluated. When we evaluate V ar(GL
ij), we observe the same pattern: It is
non-decreasing in i; see Figure 3.9(a). In addition, we observe, in Figure 3.9(a),
that as i increases, V ar(GL
ij) converges to some value, independent of i. On the
contrary, the behavior of V ar(GP
ij) can be both non-decreasing and non-increasing in
i, and this depends on the value of i; see Figure 3.9(b). Both graphs in Figure 3.9
consider j = 119 and j = 15.49
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Figure 3.8: a) V ar(i) versus i; b) V ar(i) versus i.50
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Figure 3.9: a)V ar(GL
ij) versus i; b) V ar(GP
ij) versus i.
Next we compare the variances of the gain component corresponding to leg pair
(i;j) under the limited and perfect information swapping strategies. We nd that the
gain component under the limited strategy, given by GL
ij, is more variable than that
under the perfect information strategy, given by GP
ij, when a swap is performed under
the limited strategy. Obviously, when a swap is not performed under the limited
strategy, the corresponding variance will be zero. Please refer to Figure 3.10, which
plots V ar(GP
ij) and V ar(GL
ij) versus i, considering i = j = 15 and j = 112 in (a)51
and j = 119 in (b). In both graphs, both V ar(GP
ij) and V ar(GL
ij) converge to the
same value as i gets large. We also observe that V ar(GL
ij) is non-increasing in i in
its swapping region, whereas V ar(GP
ij) can be both non-increasing or non-decreasing
in i. Finally, Figure 3.11 plots V ar(GP
ij) and V ar(GL
ij) versus j, considering i =
119 and i = j = 15.
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Figure 3.10: V ar(GL
ij) and V ar(GP
ij) versus i for (a) j = 112; (b) j = 119.52
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Figure 3.11: V ar(GL
ij) and V ar(GP
ij) versus j.
3.5.4 Analysis of the Probability Functions Corresponding
to One Leg Pair
In this section, we analyze how probability functions p
+
ij and p
 
ij behave as demand
characteristics change.
Result 3.5.4 Consider any leg i 2 L1 and j 2 L2. We have:
p
+
ij
i
= fi(C2)Fj(C2) +
Z C2
C1
(d   i)
2
i
fi(d)Fj(d) dd  0
p
 
ij
i
=  fi(C2)[1   Fj(C2)]  
Z C2
C1
fi(d)fj(d) dd  0
Thus, p
+
ij is non-decreasing in i, whereas p
 
ij is non-increasing in i.
Proof: We can write the following lower bound on
R C2
C1
(d i)
2
i fi(d)Fj(d) dd.53
Z C2
C1
(d   i)
2
i
fi(d)Fj(d) dd  Fj(C1)
Z C2
C1
(d   i)
2
i
fi(d) dd
= Fj(C1)
1
2
i
[
Z C2
C1
d fi(d) dd   i
Z C2
C1
fi(d) dd ]
= Fj(C1)
1
2
i
[ iFi(C2)   
2
ifi(C2)   iFi(C1) + 
2
ifi(C1)
  i(Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)) ]
= Fj(C1) [ fi(C1)   fi(C2) ] (3.25)
Using the lower bound derived in Equation (3.25), we can write:
p
+
ij
i
= fi(C2)Fj(C2) +
Z C2
C1
(d   i)
2
i
fi(d)Fj(d) dd
 fi(C2)Fj(C2) + Fj(C1)[fi(C1)   fi(C2)]
= Fj(C1)fi(C1) + fi(C2)[Fj(C2)   Fj(C1)]  0:
The second result is obvious.54
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Figure 3.12: a) p
+
ij versus i; b) p
 
ij versus i.55
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ij > GL
ij) versus i.
These results are intuitive: The swap assigns leg i to the aircraft with the larger
capacity (of C2). Therefore, we expect that the probability of having a positive swap
gain under the limited strategy (p
+
ij) will increase as i increases. Similarly, we expect
the probability of having a swap loss under the limited strategy (p
 
ij) to decrease as
i increases.
Through numerical integration, we evaluate these probability functions for various
values of i. Figure 3.12 illustrates how functions p
+
ij and p
 
ij change as i increases,
considering j = 119, i = 15 and 25, and j = 15. We observe the same behavior for
other values of j. As Result 3.5.4 implies, function p
+
ij is non-decreasing in i and
function p
 
ij is non-increasing in i. For lower values of i, higher demand standard
deviation, i, is better, since it leads to higher values of p
+
ij and lower values of p
 
ij. On
the other hand, for higher values of i, Figure 3.12 suggests that lower variability is
more desirable. This pattern can also be observed in Figure 3.13, which plots p
+
ij and
p
 
ij versus i for various values of i, considering again j = 119 and j = 15. For i57
values of up to Cmid (= 119), p
+
ij is non-decreasing in i, whereas p
 
ij is non-increasing
in i; thus, higher variability is preferable. On the other hand, for i values larger
than Cmid, p
+
ij is non-increasing in i and p
 
ij is non-decreasing in i, and thus, lower
variability is more desirable. Finally, the rates of change of both p
+
ij and p
 
ij reduce to
zero as i ! 1. These results are expected: As i increases beyond C2, the benets
of the higher demand on leg i reduces, since we cannot satisfy all demand due to our
capacity constraint.
Next we analyze the probability that the gain under the perfect information
swapping strategy is higher than that under the limited swapping strategy, that is,
Pr(GP
ij > GL
ij), which is given by probability p
+
ij up to the swapping point, and by
probability p
 
ij after the swapping point; see Equation (3.22). Thus, by Result 3.5.4,
this probability is non-decreasing in i up to the swapping point th
i , and is non-
increasing in i after the swapping point. This is illustrated in Figure 3.14, consider-
ing j = 119, j = 15, i = 15 and 25.
In addition, as we have observed in Figures 3.12 and 3.13, p
+
ij is non-decreasing in
i up to the swapping point, and p
 
ij is non-decreasing in i after the swapping point.
Thus, Pr(GP
ij > GL
ij) is non-decreasing in i over the values evaluated. Observe also
that both functions p
+
ij and p
 
ij converge to some value as i gets large, and this value
is independent of i; see again Figures 3.13(a) and (b). We observe the same behavior
as j gets large; see Figures 6.1(a) and (b) in the Appendix.
In summary, as the absolute magnitude of the demand imbalance (jijj) decreases
and/or demand standard deviation, i, increases, the probability that the gain of
the perfect information swapping strategy is larger than that of the limited strategy,
Pr(GP
ij > GL
ij), increases. Recall that we have observed the same behavior for the
expected dierence, E[GP
ij   GL
ij], between the perfect information and the limited
swapping strategies; please refer to Figures 3.3(b), 3.6(b), and 3.14.58
Next, we analyze the behavior of these probability functions as j changes.
Result 3.5.5 Consider any leg i 2 L1 and j 2 L2. Then, we have:
p
+
ij
j
=  fj(C2)[1   Fi(C2)]  
Z C2
C1
fi(d)fj(d)dd  0
p
 
ij
j
= Fi(C2)fj(C2) +
Z C2
C1
(d   j)
2
j
fj(d)Fi(d)dd  0
Thus, p
+
ij is non-increasing in j, whereas p
 
ij is non-decreasing in j.
The proof is very similar to the previous proof, and thus, will be omitted.
The behavior of p
+
ij versus j is similar to the behavior of p
 
ij versus i, and the
behavior of p
 
ij versus j is similar to that of p
+
ij versus i; please see Figures 6.4(a)
and (b) in the Appendix.
Finally, Result 3.5.5 indicates that the probability, Pr(GP
ij > GL
ij), is non-decreasing
in j up to the swapping point th
j , and is non-increasing in j after the swapping
point. This is depicted in Figure 3.15, considering i = 119, i = 15, and j = 15
and 25. Observe that the behavior of Pr(GP
ij > GL
ij) is similar as i increases or j
increases; see Figures 3.14 and 3.15.59
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Figure 3.15: Pr(GP
ij > GL
ij) versus j.
We will use these results when we analyze the total gain functions of the dierent
swapping strategies in the next chapter, considering a model that consists of two
swappable loops.Chapter 4
Comparison of Limited, Delayed,
and Perfect Information Swapping
Strategies
4.1 Outline
In this chapter, we present a comprehensive study on the benets (i.e., the revenue
gain) of the various swapping strategies introduced in the previous chapter, as well as
on the impact of demand characteristics on the benets of these strategies. As stated
previously, the trade-o between a delayed swapping decision, which utilizes a more
accurate demand information, but causes high disturbance to operations, and an early
swapping decision, which needs to be made under highly uncertain demand forecasts,
but will possibly require little re-scheduling of airport services and operations, should
be considered when designing a swapping strategy. In this chapter, we study various
swapping strategies that represent dierent levels of this trade-o.
6061
Specically, we focus on the three strategies described in Chapter 3: the per-
fect information swapping strategy (perfect), the limited swapping strategy (limited),
and the delayed swapping strategy (delayed). Recall that under the limited swap-
ping strategy, swapping decision is made 4-6 weeks ahead of departures, at a time
when demand is highly uncertain, and will not be revised later, whereas the delayed
swapping strategy allows the revision of the swapping decision at the beginning of
each period until departures, based on updated demand forecasts. Finally, a third
strategy, the perfect information swapping strategy, is also included in our analysis
in order to obtain an upper bound on the benets of any swapping strategy, since
this last strategy considers that perfect demand information is available at the time
of making the swapping decision, while assuming that no passengers will be lost due
to the delayed timing of the swapping decision. As stated previously, we limit our
attention to these three strategies, because each of these policies represent extreme
cases. Therefore, insights developed for these strategies can help when developing
other strategies that are combinations of these.
In this chapter, we extend the two-leg analysis of Chapter 3 to a more realistic
model, by considering two \swappable loops", each composed of a round-trip (of 2
legs) starting and ending at a common airport at similar times so that the aircraft
originally assigned to these loops can be swapped with each other, if needed. Such
loop swaps are highly desirable in practice, especially in the DDS stage, at close
proximity to departures, due to their ease of implementation and small disturbance
to operations.
Next, we use numerical integration to compare the limited and perfect information
swapping strategies, building on the results derived in Chapter 3. This is presented in
Section 4.2. Then, we extend our study to also include the delayed swapping strategy,
and compare all three strategies via a simulation model, as detailed in Section 4.2.2.62
4.2 Analysis
In this chapter we extend the two-leg analysis of Chapter 3 to a more general analytical
model, which consists of two \swappable loops", L1 and L2, where L1 = f1;3g,
L2 = f2;4g, and L = L1 [ L2. As before, Ck represents the capacity of the aircraft
type assigned to the legs in set Lk in the initial eeting solution, for k = 1;2; and Di
represents the independently, normally distributed demand on leg i, for i 2 L. We
consider that both aircraft types are in the same family so that they can be swapped
with each other in the DDS stage.
Recall that we have dened and used the term \demand imbalance" (ij = i j),
when we analyzed the two-leg model, consisting of leg pair (i;j);i 2 L1;j 2 L2,
in Chapter 3. In this chapter, we extend this term so as to include the multiple
legs considered in our swappable loops. Thus, in our loop model, we now let  
P
i2L1 i  
P
j2L2 j = (1 +3) (2 +4). Since we consider C1 < C2, a swap will
assign the aircraft having the larger capacity (of C2) to legs 1 and 3, and the aircraft
having the smaller capacity (of C1) to legs 2 and 4. Therefore, we would expect the
swap benets to increase as the demand imbalance increases. Indeed, for the simple
two-leg model studied in Chapter 3, we nd that both functions E[GL
ij] and E[GP
ij]
are non-decreasing in i;i 2 L1, while converging to a constant for large values of i;
see Result 3.5.1 in Chapter 3. Similarly, we nd that both E[GL
ij] and E[GP
ij] are non-
increasing in j;j 2 L2, while converging to zero as j becomes large; see Result 3.5.2
in Chapter 3. However, as we shall see in Section 3.4, demand imbalance is not the
only factor that aects the benets of a swap; we will introduce the other important
factors that impact the revenue gain of a swap subsequently in our analysis.
In all our analysis, we consider two aircraft types of the Boeing 737 family, having
capacities of C1 = 112 and C2 = 126 passengers, as was done in the previous chapter.63
We consider independent normal distributions for each of the four leg demands in our
loop model, having means in the values of i = f93;112;126;140;210g, for i 2 L; these
values cover dierent demand patterns ranging from demand being below capacity of
the smaller aircraft type to being above capacity of the larger aircraft type. We plan
to analyze four dierent scenarios, each with dierent demand standard deviations:
(i) i = 15, 8i 2 L; (ii) i = 25, 8i 2 L; (iii)
i
i = 0.15, 8i 2 L; and (iv)
i
i = 0.25,
8i 2 L. These values are typical of demand standard deviations experienced 4-6 weeks
before departures, the stage considered in our DDS model, by our industry partner;
please refer to the Appendix for more details on our numerical experiments. Thus,
scenarios (i) and (ii) represent systems having similar demand variability on each leg,
whereas scenarios (iii) and (iv) represent systems having similar demand coecients
of variation (
i
i, i 2 L) on each leg in the swappable loops. Consequently, in scenarios
(i) and (ii), we can observe the pure eect of demand imbalance on the gain functions
by varying the mean leg demands, while keeping the demand variability constant.
Then, in scenarios (iii) and (iv), we can observe the additional eect of demand
variability on the gain functions, since now demand variability will also increase as
mean demands (demand imbalance) increase. When the same i is considered on each
leg i;i 2 L, we denote the common demand standard deviation as , and refer to it as
the system standard deviation. Similarly, when the demand coecient of variation is
the same on each leg considered, we refer to it as the system coecient of variation.
We rst study the pure eect of demand imbalance on the gain functions under
the limited and perfect information swapping strategies. As mentioned above, for this
purpose we study systems having the same level of demand standard deviation on each
leg (i.e., scenarios (i) and (ii)), which we denote by . Thus, we vary levels of demand
imbalance in the system, while keeping demand standard deviations constant. Then
we extend this analysis to systems having a common demand coecient of variation64
by considering scenarios (iii) and (iv).
In Section 4.2.1, we rst study the eectiveness of the limited swapping strategy
via our analytical model. Then, in Section 4.2.2, we extend this analysis to also
include the delayed swapping strategy in our comparison. This is done by a simulation
model.
4.2.1 Comparison of the Limited and Perfect Information
Swapping Strategies
The limited swapping strategy is attractive in practice, especially when the re-scheduling
of operations is highly undesirable. However, since it requires the swapping decision
to be made early in time, under high demand uncertainty, it can lead to risky swaps
that might result in loss. Thus, our objective in this section is to characterize the
eectiveness of the limited swapping strategy. For this purpose, we compare the rev-
enue gain of the limited swapping strategy, GL; with GP; the revenue gain of the
perfect information strategy, which represents an upper bound on the benets of any
swapping policy. Our objective is to characterize how this dierence depends on de-
mand characteristics (i.e., mean and variance of demand on each leg in the swappable
routes).
Recall that in the limited swapping strategy, we make our swapping decision based
on the expected revenue gain of the swap (i.e., we swap if the expected revenue gain of
the swap in period T is positive; and do not swap otherwise). Thus, the expectations65
of random variables GP and GL can be expressed as follows:
E[G
P] = E[maxf
X
i2L1
i  
X
j2L2
j;0g] = E[maxf!12 + !34;0g]
E[G
L] = maxfE[
X
i2L1
i  
X
j2L2
j];0g = maxfE[!12] + E[!34];0g (4.1)
Thus, the expected gain under the limited strategy can be obtained using Equa-
tion (3.13), derived in Chapter 3. However, as stated in Chapter 3, it becomes
analytically messy to derive a closed-form expression for the expected gain under the
perfect information swapping strategy. Observe that:
E[G
P] = E[maxf!12 + !34;0g]
 E[maxf!12;0g] + E[maxf!34;0g]
= E[!
+
12] + E[!
+
34]
Similarly,
E[G
P] = E[maxf!14 + !32;0g]
 E[!
+
14] + E[!
+
32]
Consequently, we make use of the following upper bound on E[GP]:
E[G
P]  minf E[ !
+
12] + E[!
+
34]; E[!
+
14] + E[!
+
32 ] g  E[GP] (4.2)
Thus, we can determine our upper bound using the closed-form expressions for E[!
+
ij],
i 2 L1;j 2 L2, derived in Chapter 3 (see Equation (3.9)).
As below, we rst analyze the quality of the upper bound, E[GP], given in Equa-
tion (4.2), which in fact provides an upper bound on the expected revenue gain
possible in any swapping strategy. We simulate the loop model under the perfect
information strategy, considering various values of mean and standard deviations for66
demands on the four legs; and determine the expected gain under the perfect informa-
tion swapping strategy over 1000 replications. Figure 4.1 shows how E[GP], obtained
analytically using Equation (4.2), compares with E[GP], the expected revenue of the
perfect information strategy determined in the simulation, when i = 15, 8i 2 L. We
observe similar patterns for dierent values of demand standard deviations. Thus,
our simulation results show that this upper bound is quite close to the expectations
obtained by simulation (for example, an average deviation of 7.5% for the case where
i = 15, 8i 2 L). Observe also that the larger the demand imbalance is, the smaller
the dierence between our upper bound and the simulation result; our upper bound
gets stronger as demand imbalance increases. The reason is very intuitive: As the
demand imbalance increases, random variables !ij, i 2 L1;j 2 L2 generally take on
negative values with lower probabilities. Thus, the upper bound better approximates
E[GP].
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Figure 4.1: E[GP] (obtained analytically) and E[GP] (obtained via simulation) versus
demand imbalance when i = 15, 8i 2 L.67
In what follows, we use numerical integration to determine the expected revenue
under the limited swapping policy, given in Equation (4.1), using Equation (3.13)
derived in Chapter 3; and the upper bound on the expected revenue under the perfect
information swapping policy, given in Equation (4.2), using Equation (3.9) derived
in Chapter 3, considering various values of demand parameters on the four legs and
scenarios (i) and (ii). Our objective is to determine how far the gain of the limited
strategy is from the potential gain possible, and how this dierence is aected by
demand characteristics such as demand imbalance and variability so that we can
obtain insights on how to manage the exible capacity in the system (i.e., when the
limited strategy should be used in practice).
We rst study how the upper bound on the expected gain of swapping changes
as demand imbalance and/or demand variability increase; see Figure 4.2, which plots
E[GP] versus demand imbalance for system demand standard deviations 15 and 25
(scenarios (i) and (ii)). We observe that the upper bound is generally non-decreasing
in demand imbalance for both system standard deviations. In addition, we observe
that for non-positive levels of demand imbalance (  0), higher system standard
deviation leads to a higher expected gain, whereas for positive levels of demand im-
balance ( > 0), lower system standard deviation is preferable. Observe that these
ndings are consistent with the results obtained in Chapter 3 for the two-leg model;
see Results 3.5.1 and 3.5.2; and Figures 3.1(a), 3.2, 3.4(a) and 3.5 in Chapter 3. We
observed a similar behavior in scenarios (iii) and (iv).68
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Figure 4.2: E[GP] versus demand imbalance.
Similarly, Figure 4.3 shows how E[GL], the expected gain under the limited swap-
ping strategy, changes as (i) demand imbalance varies, and (ii) system demand stan-
dard deviation increases from 15 to 25.
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Figure 4.3: E[GL] versus demand imbalance.69
Observe that when demand imbalance is non-positive (i.e.,   0), a swap is
generally not made under the limited swapping strategy; thus, its expected gain is
zero. The cases where a swap is made under the limited strategy usually correspond
to those with positive demand imbalance (i.e.,  > 0): We observe that in this
region, E[GL] is non-decreasing in demand imbalance. In addition, when a swap is
made, then lower demand variability leads to higher expected gain under the limited
swapping strategy, as was the case with E[GP]. These ndings are consistent with
the results obtained in Chapter 3 for the two-leg model; see Results 3.5.1 and 3.5.2;
and Figures 3.3(a), 3.6(a), 6.2, and 6.3. Thus, the limited strategy performs better
under high demand imbalance and low demand variability.
Next we compare the expected gain under the limited strategy with the upper
bound, E[GP], and analyze their dierence. In Figure 4.4(a), we plot the expected
gain under the limited swapping strategy, E[GL], and the upper bound, E[GP], versus
demand imbalance when the system demand standard deviation is 15 (scenario (i));
and in Figure 4.4(b), we plot their dierence, given by E[GP] E[GL], versus demand
imbalance for system standard deviations of 15 and 25 (scenarios (i) and (ii)). We can
analyze both graphs in two regions: The rst region corresponds to non-positive levels
of demand imbalance (i.e.,   0). In this region, generally no swaps are made under
the limited strategy, and therefore, E[GL] is zero. Then, E[GP]   E[GL] is simply
given by E[GP], which is increasing both in demand imbalance and also in  in this
region as was observed in Figure 4.2. The second region corresponds to positive levels
of demand imbalance ( > 0). In this region, a swap is usually made under the limited
strategy. We observe that the dierence, E[GP] E[GL], is now decreasing in demand
imbalance, but is still increasing in . Observe that these results are very similar to
the ndings of Chapter 3; see Results 3.5.1 and 3.5.2; and Figures 3.3 and 3.6. These
results are very intuitive. When the absolute magnitude of the demand imbalance in70
the system, jj, is large, the swapping decision under the limited swapping strategy will
not be very risky; that is, the decision of to swap in the limited swapping strategy will
likely result in revenue gain, whereas the decision of not to swap will likely avoid loss.
Thus, the swapping decisions under the limited and perfect information strategies will
likely be similar in such cases, and therefore, their expected dierence small. However,
when the absolute magnitude of the demand imbalance, jj, is small, the swapping
decision in the limited swapping strategy will be more risky, and hence, the swapping
decisions under the limited and perfect information strategies will not always be the
same.71
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Figure 4.4: a) E[GP] and E[GL] versus demand imbalance; b)E[GP]   E[GL] versus
demand imbalance.
In fact, as can be observed in Figure 4.4, we nd that although the concept of72
demand imbalance explains most of the variations in the expected gain functions in the
loop model under the perfect information and limited swapping strategies, there still
exists some noise, especially when the absolute magnitude of the demand imbalance,
jj, is small, and hence, the swapping decision under the limited swapping strategy is
highly risky. This is because the risk factor in such cases is not uniquely determined by
the demand imbalance; similar levels of demand imbalance can correspond to dierent
combinations of the mean demands, which would aect the benets of swapping. In
order to demonstrate this behavior, we now graph E[GP] and E[GL] versus the sum of
the mean demands on legs assigned to the smaller capacity of C1 (
P
i2L1 i = 1+3),
while holding all mean demands on legs assigned to the larger capacity of C2 constant
(i.e., 2 and 4 are held constant at values of 2 = 4 = 112, while 2 = 4 = 15); see
Figures 4.5 and 4.6. For each value of 1+3, we plot dierent combinations of 1 and
3, thus generating dierent curves with same levels of demand imbalance. Similarly,
in Figures 4.7 and 4.8, we graph E[GP] and E[GL] versus
P
j2L2 j = 2 + 4, while
holding all mean demands on legs in set L1 constant (i.e., 1 and 3 are constant).
Thus, we observe that although each curve exhibits a similar behavior (i.e., functions
E[GP] and E[GL] are both non-decreasing in 1 + 3, and are non-increasing in
2 + 4), their values can be dierent for the same level of demand imbalance. In
addition, we observe that usually the larger the absolute dierence between 1 and
3 (i.e., j1   3j), the lower the values of E[GL] and E[GP] are.73
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In order to give the reader a better idea on behavior of the expected gain functions
under the limited and perfect information swapping strategies, we also plot the 3-
dimensional graphs of these functions, where the x-axis represents
P
i2L1 i = 1+3,
y-axis represents
P
i2L2 i = 2 + 4, and z-axis represents the functions E[GL] or
E[GP]. These graphs are given in Figure 4.10.
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Figure 4.9: E[GL] versus 1 + 3 and 2 + 4.76
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Figure 4.10: E[GP] versus 1 + 3 and 2 + 4.
Thus, in addition to demand imbalance, we need other factors to explain the
variation in the dierence between the expected gain under the limited swapping
strategy, E[GL], and our upper bound, E[GP], for cases where the absolute magnitude
of the demand imbalance is small. Consider rst the case with small and positive
demand imbalance; that is, the sum of the mean demands initially assigned to the
aircraft having the smaller capacity (of C1), 1 + 3, is larger, but still close, in
magnitude, to 2+4, the sum of the mean demands initially assigned to the aircraft
having the larger capacity (of C2). In this case, a swap will generally be performed77
under the limited swapping strategy, but the swap will be highly risky. The same
level of demand imbalance can be realized for dierent combinations of the means on
the four legs. In fact, the smaller 1 and 3 are compared to aircraft capacity C2
(or, alternatively, the larger 2 and 4 compared to C1), the more risky the swapping
decision under the limited swapping strategy, and hence the larger the dierence will
be between the gain under the limited swapping strategy and the upper bound. As
an example of this case, consider the following two scenarios, under each of which a
swap is performed under the limited swapping strategy:
(1)(1;2;3;4) = (140;126;140;126); i = 15;8i 2 L
(2)(1;2;3;4) = (126;112;126;112); i = 15;8i 2 L:
Thus, we have the same level of demand imbalance of  = 28 for both scenarios.
Recall that C1 = 112 and C2 = 126 in our analysis. Observe that 1 and 3 in
scenario (2) are at the value of C2 (and 2 and 4 are at the value of C1), whereas
1 and 3 in scenario (1) are larger than C2 (and 2 and 4 are larger than C1).
Thus, the swap performed under the limited swapping strategy in scenario (2) will
be more risky than that in scenario (1), and hence, the perfect information swapping
strategy should be more benecial for scenario (2). Indeed, E[GP] E[GL] in the rst
scenario is 1:6, while that in the second scenario is 2:7; please refer to the Appendix
for all results. Consider now the following two scenarios, under each of which a swap
is performed under the limited swapping strategy:
(3)(1;2;3;4) = (126;112;126;126); i = 15;8i 2 L
(4)(1;2;3;4) = (140;112;112;126); i = 15;8i 2 L:
Thus, we have the same level of demand imbalance of  = 14 for both scenarios.
Observe that the sum of 1 + 3, and the values of 2, and 4 are the same in both78
scenarios. However, both 1 and 3 are at the values of C2 in scenario (3), whereas
1 is above C2, and 3 is below C2 in scenario (4). We have that E[GP]   E[GL]
in the third scenario is 4:3, while that in the fourth scenario is 3:7. In fact, analysis
several other scenarios, where demand imbalance is small but positive such that a
swap is performed under the limited swapping strategy. We observe that keeping
2+4 constant, E[GP] E[GL] increases as one of 1 or 3 increases above C2 (and
thus, the other one reaches a value below C2). Similarly, for scenarios with small but
negative demand imbalance such that a a swap is not performed under the limited
swapping strategy, we observe that keeping 1+3 constant, the expected dierence,
E[GP] E[GL], increases as one of 2 or 4 increases above C2 (and thus, the other one
reaches a value below C2). Hence, we include another factor, the absolute deviation
from capacity, in our analysis, which is dened as:
DevCap 
8
> <
> :
P
i2L1 ji   C2j +
P
i2L2 ji   C1j; if q = 1,
P
i2L1 ji   C1j +
P
i2L2 ji   C2j; otherwise.
Thus, for a given level of demand imbalance, we observe that the expected dier-
ence is non-increasing as the absolute deviation from capacity increases; see Fig-
ures 4.11 and 4.12, which plot E[GP] E[GL] versus absolute deviation from capacity
for cases having demand imbalance levels of 0 and 14, respectively.79
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Figure 4.11: E[GP]   E[GL] versus absolute deviation from capacity for scenarios
having demand imbalance = 0.
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Figure 4.12: E[GP]   E[GL] versus absolute deviation from capacity for scenarios
having demand imbalance = 14.80
These results suggest that the limited swapping strategy is an attractive strategy in
practice, when the demand uncertainty in the system is low, and demand imbalance is
positive and large, or demand imbalance is negative and large (i.e., when jj is large).
However, its performance degrades as demand uncertainty increases and demand im-
balance is medium and absolute deviation from capacity is low. It performs worst for
systems with zero demand imbalance.
The next section presents a comprehensive simulation study carried out to com-
pare the benets of the limited swapping strategy with the delayed swapping strategy
when demand variability is the same on all legs in the swappable loops.
4.2.2 Comparison of the Delayed Swapping Strategy with the
Limited and Perfect Information Swapping Strategies
As mentioned before, the delayed swapping strategy reduces the number of risky
swaps by allowing revisions to the swapping decision later on, based on updated
demand forecasts, but at the expense of larger disruptions to operations. Thus, in
this section, we study the eectiveness of the delayed swapping strategy by comparing
it with the limited and perfect information swapping strategies through a simulation
model. In order to study the pure eect of demand characteristics on the swapping
gain, we consider two swappable loops, each having the same level of demand standard
deviation of 15, and mean demands in the range of i = f93;112;126;140;210g, for
i 2 L, as was done in the previous section. We plan to extend this analysis to
systems having a common demand standard deviation of 25 as well as a common
demand coecient of variation of 0:15 and 0:25 in our subsequent research.
Specically, in our simulation model we consider a time horizon of T = 6 weeks
in the DDS stage. The swapping decision under the limited and delayed swapping81
strategies is made 6 weeks prior to departures, based on the expected revenue gain
of the swap. Then, under the delayed swapping strategy, revisions are allowed to
the swapping decision at the beginning of every week t, t = T   1; ;1, where t
represents the number of periods until departures, and these revisions are based on the
demand forecasts updated at the beginning of each week. However, no revisions to the
swapping devision are allowed under the delayed swapping strategy, if the number of
tickets already sold on legs that will be swapped to the smaller capacity C1 is already
above the capacity of this aircraft; that is, no revisions are allowed at the beginning
of period t if
PT
j=t+1 d2j > C1 or
PT
j=t+1 d4j > C1; please see Chapter 3, Section 3.2
for a detailed description of the delayed swapping strategy and our demand forecast
updating mechanism. As described in Section 3.2, we consider a single class on each
leg and assume that the demand, Dit, on leg i in period t is normally distributed,
and is independent among legs and across time; this assumption is also used in the
demand forecasting system of our industry partner. Thus, Di, the total demand on
leg i;i 2 L, is still normally distributed with mean i and standard deviation i, as
has been considered in all the previous analysis. Observing the real data on several
ight legs provided to us by our industry partner, we have derived some factors to
obtain the mean and variance of the demand on leg i in week t, Dit;i 2 L;t =
T; ;1; as well as the cumulative demand observed on the leg prior to time T. Of
course the factors selected for this model will aect the performance of the delayed
swapping strategy. We have used the same set of factors in all the following analysis.
In our simulation, we use the greatest integer less than or equal to the demand value
generated to obtain integral demands. Each simulation scenario is replicated 10;000
times and performance measures have been averaged over all replications; please see
the Appendix for details on the scenarios. Observe that in our simulation model we
can obtain the exact expression for the expected gain under the perfect information82
swapping strategy, E[GP], which, as mentioned above, represents an upper bound
on the expected revenue gain of any swapping strategy. Hence, we make use of this
expression in our comparisons instead of E[GP], the upper bound on it.
Our simulation results for a system demand standard deviation of 15 are sum-
marized in Figures 4.13{4.16. Specically, Figure 4.13 plots the expected dierences
between the perfect information and the delayed swapping strategies, E[GP   GD],
and between the perfect and the limited swapping strategies, E[GP   GL], versus
demand imbalance, whereas Figure 4.14 plots Pr(GP > GL), the probability that
the gain under the limited swapping strategy is strictly less than the upper bound,
versus demand imbalance. Finally, Figures 4.15 and 4.16 plot the average number of
swaps (or revisions to the swapping decision) under the delayed and limited swap-
ping strategies, respectively. Observe that under the limited swapping strategy, the
number of swaps in each scenario will be either 0 or 1, whereas under the delayed
swapping strategy, the number of swaps (including the revisions) can be between 0
and 6, since there is a potential to revise the swap at the beginning of every week
during the horizon of 6 weeks considered in the simulation. Note also that simulation
results will have more noise than the analytical results.
These gures suggest the following conclusions:
 We observe that the behavior of the expected dierence between the perfect
and limited information swapping strategies in the simulation versus demand
imbalance is very similar to the analytical results; please see Figure 4.4(b):
As the absolute magnitude of the demand imbalance increases, the expected
gain of the limiting swapping strategy approaches to the upper bound. We
observe the same behavior on the expected dierence between the delayed and
limited swapping strategies, E[GD GL], versus demand imbalance. In addition,
the expected dierence between the perfect information and delayed swapping83
strategies is much smaller than that between the delayed and limited swapping
strategies. Thus, the delayed swapping strategy achieves most benets of a
perfect information strategy with a nite number (and as we shall see, in fact
a small number) of swaps. We also found that in addition to the demand
imbalance, the absolute deviation from capacity factor, discussed in the previous
section, is successful in explaining the variations in these expected dierences.
 Recall that we have studied the behavior of the probability function, Pr(GP
ij >
GL
ij), only for the simple two-leg model in Chapter 3 (please see Results 3.5.4
and 3.5.5 and Figures 3.14 and 3.15), but not for our two-loop model, since
determining this probability, considering the four legs, involves a large number
of integrations. However, our simulation results in Figure 4.14 show that this
probability function behaves similar to those analytical results for the two-leg
model: The larger the absolute magnitude of the demand imbalance is, the
smaller this probability.
 Interestingly, we observe that the average number of swaps performed under the
delayed swapping strategy in the DDS stage is surprisingly low (a maximum of
1:33 swaps on the average under the delayed strategy); please see Figure 4.15.
However, as discussed above, the delayed swapping strategy achieves most ben-
ets of the perfect information strategy (the upper bound). Thus, these benets
are achieved by a very small number of additional swaps performed under the
delayed strategy! Analyzing the simulation results in detail, we nd that most
swaps under the delayed swapping strategy are, in fact, performed 4   6 weeks
away from departures, thus not causing much disturbance to operations. This
is partly due to our swapping rule, which prohibits swaps when more passengers
than the smaller capacity are already ticketed on legs that will be swapped to84
the smaller capacity. However, the results suggest that swaps performed early
in time can be highly eective. Also observe that when the absolute demand
imbalance in the system is large, then the number of swaps under the delayed
swapping strategy is very similar to those under the limited swapping strategy;
please see Figures 4.15 and 4.16. This is because swaps made under the limited
strategy in these regions are generally not risky. Only when the absolute de-
mand imbalance in the system is small, the delayed strategy needs to perform
revisions to the initial swapping decision. However, as mentioned, the number
of these additional swaps is very low (0.32 more swaps on the averages).
Thus, this analysis suggests that for swappable loops having similar demand vari-
ability on each legs: (1) the limited swapping strategy provides an excellent way to
hedge against the demand uncertainty, when the absolute demand imbalance in the
system is high and demand uncertainty is low; (2) otherwise, a strategy that allows
the revision of the swapping decision later on, such as the delayed swapping strategy
studied here, can be utilized. Such a strategy can achieve most potential benets of
swapping, and with only a very small number of additional swaps, mostly performed
1-2 weeks after the initial swapping decision.85
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
-100 -50 0 50 100
demand imbalance
E[G  - G  ]
E[G  - G  ]
P
P
L
D
Figure 4.13: E[GP   GD] and E[GD   GL] versus demand imbalance.
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Figure 4.14: Pr(GP > GL) versus demand imbalance.86
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Figure 4.15: Average number of swaps under the delayed swapping strategy in the
DDS stage.
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Figure 4.16: Average number of swaps under the limited swapping strategy in the
DDS stage.Chapter 5
A Simulation Study Considering
Multiple Fare-Classes
5.1 Simulation Model with Multiple Fare Classes
In this section, we extend our simulation model to consider two fare-classes on each
ight leg, where fare-class 1 corresponds to the class having the more expensive fare.
Thus, we would like to ll our capacities with as many class 1 customers as possible.
However, since the higher fare customers might arrive after lower fare customers, it
is common practice in the airline industry to set aside a certain number of seats for
anticipated future arrivals of the higher fare customers and protect them from the
lower fare customers. The number of these reserved seats is referred to as the protec-
tion level in the airline revenue management literature. One of the most commonly
used models to determine protection levels is called the EMSRb model (Barocio-Cots,
1999). This model determines the optimal protection levels under the following as-
sumptions. The model considers a single leg having only two fare-classes and assumes
8788
that demands on each fare-class are independent and all lower fare customers arrive
before the higher fare customers. Let fi denote the fare of class i;i = 1;2, and F1
denote the CDF of class 1 demand. Under these assumptions, the protection level P
can be calculated as:
P = F
 1
1 (1  
f2
f1
) (5.1)
Observe that the protection level set aside for class 1 is not dependent on the capacity
of the aircraft (as long as P  C1, which is a very reasonable assumption). Thus, in
the case of two fare-classes only, swapping aircraft is not going to aect the protection
level for class 1 (under the above assumption).
Next we describe our simulation model in detail. In order to study the pure eect
of demand variation on the benets of swapping, we will assume that the fare on each
class i;i = 1;2, is the same on each leg in the swappable loops, as was done for the
single fare-class models. Let Dc
ilt denote the cumulative demand on leg l 2 L and
fare-class i;i = 1;2, based on the forecast updated in period t, and assume that each
Dc
ilt is normally distributed with CDF Filt. As in the single fare-class model, each
demand can have dierent parameters, but we assume that demands are independent
across fare-classes, across legs, and over time.
In our simulation model, we use Equation (5.1) to determine the protection levels
for the higher fare customers on each leg l 2 L. We must note, however, that these
protection levels are not necessarily optimal in our model due to the way demands
are generated. Specically, our simulation model generates demands in each period
such that all class 2 demand is generated before all class 1 demand. However, we
still choose to determine the protection levels in the simulation using the EMSRb
equation simply because our industry partner uses the same model to determine their
protection levels.89
Next we extend our simulation model to consider two fare-classes on each leg. Let
Plt denote the protection level on leg l 2 L updated in period t and da
ilt denotes the
total realized demand of class i customers on leg i up to time t.
Recall that t represents the number of periods until departures (i.e., number of
periods \to go"). The initial capacity assignment is such that capacity of Ci is assigned
to legs in Li;i = 1;2, where C1 < C2 and L1 [L2 correspond to the set of legs in the
swappable loops.
The ow-chart of the simulation model is given below.
Set t = T
1. Update the demand forecast for class i and leg l, i = 1;2;l 2 L.
2. Update the protection level, Plt, l 2 L. (Note that if the updated protection
level is less than the number of the realized class 1 customers, then we adjust
the protection level to be the number of realized class 1 customers.
3. Determine the expected revenue gain, E[G], for the swappable loops. If E[G] >
0 and
P2
i=1 da
ilt  C1, for 8l 2 L2, then swap capacities C1 and C2.
4. Generate d2lt, 8l 2 L. Update the available capacities.
5. Generate d1lt, 8l 2 L. Update the available capacities.
6. If t = 1, then stop. Otherwise, let t = t   1 and go to step 1.
Under the delayed swapping strategy, all the above steps are performed every period,
whereas the limited swapping strategy requires this process to be performed only at
time T, which, as mentioned previously, is typically 4   6 weeks prior to departures
when partial demand information is available. Also recall that under the perfect
swapping strategy, the swapping decision is made under perfect demand information.90
In addition, forecast updating is performed in a way similar to the single fare-class
simulation model (see Section 4.2.2).
In the next section we describe our simulation experiments and discuss the results.
5.2 Simulation Experiments and Discussion of the
Results
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Figure 5.1: Expected gain under the limited, delayed, and perfect swapping strategies.91
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Figure 5.2: Dierence in gain between the perfect and limited swapping strategies
and between the perfect and delayed swapping strategies.
Recall that the demand for each class on each leg is considered to be normally dis-
tributed and independent among classes, across legs and over time. Clearly demand
patterns for the dierent class customers over time will signicantly aect the eec-
tiveness of our swapping strategies. We analyzed some data provided to us by our
industry partner, United Airlines, to model the demand patterns for each customer
class over time. We found that demand patterns for dierent fare classes vary depend-
ing on the markets served and the time of the day. However, we also found out that
demand patterns, where the mean demand for higher fare class customers is increas-
ing over time and the mean demand for lower fare class customers is decreasing over
time is common for most markets. Since the data obtained from United Airlines was92
condential, we decided to use the following factors to approximate demands for the
two fare-classes in our simulation model: Considering a seven period model to cover a
six week period (the length of each period is not necessarily equal) our factors for the
higher fare-class were taken as f0:03;0:05;0:08;0:12;0:16;0:22;0:34g, whereas those
for the lower fare-class were taken as f0:37;0:19;0:14;0:12;0:1;0:07;0:01g. These fac-
tors are used to split a total mean demand for each class and leg over the seven
periods to the individual periods. Then we used demand standard deviations of 15
and 25 respectively for each demand distribution. We must note here, however, that
an extensive simulation study, considering dierent demand patterns for the dierent
fare classes over time, needs to be carried out to assess a more reliable performance
of the dierent swapping strategies. Our preliminary results are intended to give an
idea on this eect.
As in the single fare-class model, we consider two aircraft of the same family
having capacities C1 = 112 and C2 = 126. The total mean demands on each leg (over
the two classes and seven periods) are varied in f93:3;112;126;140g. We assume
that the total mean demand for class 1 customers (over the seven periods) is 20% of
the total mean demand on the leg (over the seven periods), and the remaining 80%
corresponds to that for class 2 customers. We also assume that the fare of class 1 is 3
times larger than the fare of class 2. Recall that class fares are the same on each leg.
All these data are based, again, on the analysis of our industry partner's data. It is
an important future research direction to perform an extensive design of experiments
and run more simulation experiments.
Next we briey summarize the simulation results for the two fare-class model and
compare them with the results obtained for the single fare-class model. Figure 5.1
shows how the expected gain behaves under the limited, delayed, and perfect swapping
strategies. The dierence in expected gain between the perfect and limited swapping93
strategies and between the perfect and delayed swapping strategies are depicted in
Figure 5.2. Finally, Figure 5.3 shows the average number of swaps under the limited
and the delayed swapping strategies. Based on these gures, we make the following
observations (please refer to Chapter 4 for comparison of these results with those of
the single fare-class model).
1. The expected gain patterns under the perfect swapping strategy versus demand
imbalance for the two fare-class model are similar to those of the single fare-
class model. Observe also that the expected gain of all the swapping strategies
converge to the same value as demand imbalance increases (see Figure 5.2 (a)).
2. The average number of swaps in the limited case is very similar to those ob-
tained for the single fare-class model. This number is close to 0 for large negative
demand imbalance and close to 1 for large positive demand imbalance. The av-
erage number of swaps in the delayed strategy is less than 2 (out of a possible 6)
for the case where the system demand standard deviation is 15 (see Figure 5.3).
These numbers are comparable to the results for the single fare-class model.
As a last note, we repeat that the results from our simulation model are based on one
data set of demand patterns and fares. In order to fully capture the eectiveness of
these swappign strategies for a multiple fare-class model, it is necessary to perform a
careful design of experiments.94
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Figure 5.3: Number of swaps in the limited and delayed swapping strategies.Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Research
Directions
An airline's supply management (i.e., eet assignment and crew scheduling) decisions
greatly impact its revenues. Certain crew regulations and operating characteristics
of the airline companies dictate that these decisions be made well in advance of
departures, at a time when demand is highly uncertain. However, demand forecasts
improve markedly over time as more information on demand patterns is obtained.
Thus, it becomes essential for an airline to update its supply management decisions
dynamically over time. This provides the airline with an improved ability to match its
supply and demand. Although such a dynamic, demand-driven supply management
process is constrained by the initial decisions and is dicult to implement, eective
supply management strategies can still be devised by taking advantage of the inherent
exibilities in the system. In this research, we collaborate with the United Airlines
Research and Development Division.
In this thesis, we analyze a Demand Driven Swapping (DDS) approach that aims
9596
at improving the airline's revenue by reducing the supply-demand mismatches through
dynamically swapping aircraft. Due to the proximity to departures, the DDS problem
is restricted by two main connstraints: 1) the initial crew schedule needs to be kept
intact (due to certain union contracts); and 2) airport services and operations need
to be preserved to the greatest extent possible. As a result, only a limited number
of simple swaps can be performed between aircraft types of the same family (i.e.,
crew-compatible aircraft types). However, the swaps can be potentially performed
on a daily basis given the initial eet assignments. Clearly, the swapping criteria,
frequency, and timing will highly impact the revenue benets of the DDS approach.
When the swapping decisions are made several weeks prior to departures (i.e., 4-6
weeks before departures), they will not cause much disturbance to operations, but
will be performed under highly uncertain demand information. On the other hand,
swapping decisions that are delayed to a later time (i.e., 1-3 weeks before depar-
tures) will decrease the possibility of bad swaps, but will result in larger costs due to
higher disruptions to airport services and operations. Thus, our research objective
is to understand the critical parameters that aect the benets of a DDS strategy
so as to analyze the eectiveness of dierent several demand-driven aircraft swap-
ping strategies as a way to hedge against the demand uncertainty in the system.
For this purpose, we consider dierent swapping strategies, characterized in terms of
their frequency, and study simple analytical models to gain insights into the critical
parameters that aect the expected revenue benets of each strategy.
Our analytical results suggest that strategies that make the swapping decision
early in time (in order to minimize disturbances to the operations) perform very
well on routes, where the demand uncertainty is low and the expected demands
on the legs are well-balanced. Otherwise, a swapping strategy, which revises the
swapping decision over time, should be implemented. We then extend our analysis to97
more general models through simulation. Our simulation results, based on real data
obtained from United Airlines, conrm the analytical ndings.
Several extensions to our models deserve further analysis, as summarized in the
following section.
6.1 Future Research Directions
In this research, we consider simple analytical models under certain (and restrictive)
assumptions for analytical tractability. For example, we consider a single fare-class
on each leg and assume that leg demand distributions are independent, having pa-
rameters (mean and variance) that are known with certainty at the outset. However,
in reality, many fare-classes will exist on each leg, each consisting of customers with
dierent arrival patterns over time. Considering more realistic patterns of customer
demand and including customer cancellation and overbooking policies in our models
would be important extensions to this research. In addition, considering the cost of
rescheduling would be useful from a cost/benet analysis of swapping. Furthermore,
demand patterns will be correlated between legs and over time, and demand param-
eters will not be known with certainty at the outset. Although in our simulation
models some of these assumptions were relaxed to some extent (i.e., our simulation
model allows demand forecast updating in the delayed swapping strategy and con-
siders a model having two fare-classes), these aspects have not been considered in
the analytical models. Thus, studying analytical models that relax some of these
assumptions would be interesting and worthy extensions of the ones studied in this
thesis. In addition, our simulation models need to be extended considering a variety
of demand patterns.
In practice, the implementation of a DDS approach requires the integration of98
the airline's revenue management and aircraft swapping decisions. To our knowledge,
the revenue management problem under swappable capacities has not been studied
in the extensive airline revenue management literature. Thus, considering multiple
fare-classes on each leg, a challenging and interesting research direction would be to
devise eective revenue management strategies under swappable aircraft capacities.
In this research, we consider a small number of swapping strategies, all of which
make decisions based on the revenue expectation of the swaps. An interesting future
research direction would be to study some other strategies that make their decisions
based on dierent criteria. This research is one of the rst attempts to analyze the
eectiveness of dierent demand-driven aircraft swapping strategies as a way to hedge
against the demand uncertainty in the system; and to understand the drivers of these
benets. Thus, we believe that this thesis provides an important basis and guidelines
for future research.References
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Fundamentals
In this section of the Appendix, we derive some basic expressions that will be essential
in our subsequent derivations.
We assume that D is a normal random variable with mean , standard deviation
, probability density function (pdf) f(:) and cumulative distribution function (CDF)
F(:). We let y;y1 and y2 denote some constants.
In what follows, we derive the rst and second moments of D; and the rst and
second derivatives of its pdf and CDF with respect to  and .
First Order Moments
In what follows, we denote the rst order partial moments (expectations) of random
variable D as
E
y
 1(D) =
Z y
 1
Df(D)dD; and E
+1
y (D) =
Z +1
y
Df(D)dD
From Winkler et al. (1972), we have:
E
y
 1(D) =  F(y)   
2f(y) (6.1)
E
+1
y (D) =  [1   F(y)] + 
2f(y) (6.2)
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Also, we observe that,
E(DjD  y) =
1
F(y)
E
y
 1(D) =    
2 f(y)
F(y)
(6.3)
E(DjD  y) =
1
[1   F(y)]
E
+1
y (D) =  + 
2 f(y)
[1   F(y)]
(6.4)
E(Djy1 < D < y2) =
1
[F(y2)   F(y1)]
[ E
y2
 1(D)   E
y1
 1(D) ]
=  +
1
[F(y2)   F(y1)]

2(f(y1)   f(y2)) (6.5)
Second Order Moments
We dene the second order partial moments of random variable D as
E
y
 1(D
2) =
Z y
 1
D
2f(D)dD; and E
+1
y (D
2) =
Z +1
y
D
2f(D)dD
From Winkler et al. (1972), we have:
E
y
 1(D
2) = (
2 + 
2) F(y)   
2 (y + ) f(y) (6.6)
E
+1
y (D
2) = (
2 + 
2) [1   F(y)] + 
2 (y + ) f(y) (6.7)
Again, we also observe that,
E(D
2jD  y) =
1
F(y)
E
y
 1(D
2)
= 
2 + 
2   
2 (y + )
f(y)
F(y)
(6.8)
E(D
2jD  y) =
1
1   F(y)
E
+1
y (D
2)
= 
2 + 
2 + 
2 (y + )
f(y)
[1   F(y)]
(6.9)
E(D
2jy1 < D < y2) =
1
[F(y2)   F(y1)]
[ E
y2
 1(D
2)   E
y1
 1(D
2) ] (6.10)
= 
2 + 
2 +
1
[F(y2)   F(y1)]

2[(y1 + )f(y1)   (y2 + )f(y2)]107
First Derivatives of f(.) and F(.) with respect to  and 
We derive:
F(d)

=  f(d);
F(d)

= (   d)f(d) (6.11)
Similarly, we derive:
f(d)

=
(d   )
2 f(d);
f(d)

=
(d   )2
3 f(d)  
1

f(d) (6.12)
This fundamentals will be used in our subsequent derivations.
Derivations in Section 3.5.1
In what follows, we consider that Di are independently normally distributed with
mean i, standard deviation i, pdf fi(:) and CDF Fi(:), for i 2 L.108
Derivation of p
+
ij
Recall, Equation (3.6). We can write p
+
ij as follows:
p
+
ij = Pr(Dj < C1 < Di < C2) + Pr(C1 < Dj < Di < C2)
+ Pr(Dj < C1 < C2 < Di) + Pr(C1 < Dj < C2 < Di)
= [Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)]Fj(C1) +
Z C2
C1
Z di
C1
fj(dj)fi(di)ddjddi
+ Fj(C1)[1   Fi(C2)] + [Fj(C2)   Fj(C1)][1   Fi(C2)]
= [Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)]Fj(C1) + [1   Fi(C2)]Fj(C2) +
Z C2
C1
(Fj(di)   Fj(C1))fi(di)ddi
= [1   Fi(C2)]Fj(C2) + [Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)]Fj(C1)
  Fj(C1)[Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)] +
Z C2
C1
fi(d)Fj(d)dd
= Fj(C2)[1   Fi(C2)] +
Z C2
C1
fi(d)Fj(d)dd (6.13)
The derivation of the expression on p
 
ij, given in Equation (3.7), is similar, and
therefore, will be omitted.109
Derivation of E[!
+
ij]
Following Equation (3.8), E[!
+
ij] can be expressed as:
E[!
+
ij] = E[Di   C1jDj < C1 < Di < C2]Pr(Dj < C1 < Di < C2)
+ E[Di   DjjC1 < Dj < Di < C2]Pr(C1 < Dj < Di < C2)
+ E[C2   C1jDj < C1 < C2 < Di]Pr(Dj < C1 < C2 < Di)
+ E[C2   DjjC1 < Dj < C2 < Di]Pr(C1 < Dj < C2 < Di)
= Pr(Dj < C1 < Di < C2)fE[DijC1 < Di < C2]   C1g
+
Z C2
C1
Z C2
dj
(di   dj)fj(dj)fi(di)ddjddi + Pr(Dj < C1 < C2 < Di)[C2   C1]
+ Pr(C1 < Dj < C2 < Di)fC2   E[DjjC1 < Dj < C2]g (6.14)
Using Equation (6.5), E[!
+
ij] can be rewritten as:
E[!
+
ij] = Fj(C1)[Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)]fi +
1
[Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)]

2
i[fi(C1)   fi(C2)]   C1g
+
Z C2
C1
Z C2
dj
(di   dj)fj(dj)fi(di) ddi ddj + [C2   C1][1   Fi(C2)]Fj(C1)
+ [1   Fi(C2)][Fj(C2)   Fi(C1)]fC2   [j +
1
[Fj(C2)   Fj(C1)]

2
j[fj(C1)   fj(C2)]]g
= C2Fj(C2)[1   Fi(C2)]   C1Fj(C1)[1   Fi(C1)]
  j[Fj(C2)   Fj(C1)][1   Fi(C2)]   
2
j[fj(C1)   fj(C2)][1   Fi(C2)]
+ iFj(C1)[Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)] + 
2
i[fi(C1)   fi(C2)]Fj(C1)
+
Z C2
C1
Z C2
dj
(di   dj)fj(dj)fi(di) ddi ddj (6.15)110
Now we simplify the term
R C2
C1
R C2
dj (di   dj)fj(dj)fi(di) ddi ddj using Equation (6.5):
Z C2
C1
Z C2
dj
(di   dj)fj(dj)fi(di) ddi ddj
=
Z C2
C1
Z C2
dj
difj(dj)fi(di) ddi ddj  
Z C2
C1
Z C2
dj
djfj(dj)fi(di) ddi ddj
=
Z C2
C1
[i[Fi(C2)   Fi(dj)] + 
2
i[fi(dj)   fi(C2)]]fj(dj) ddj
 
Z C2
C1
djfj(dj)[Fi(C2)   Fi(dj)] ddj
= iFi(C2)[Fj(C2)   Fj(C1)]   i
Z C2
C1
Fi(d)fj(d) dd
+ 
2
i
Z C2
C1
fi(d)fj(d) dd   
2
ifi(C2)[Fj(C2)   Fj(C1)]
  Fi(C2)[j[Fj(C2)   Fj(C1)] + 
2
j[fj(C1)   fj(C2)]]
+
Z C2
C1
d fj(d)Fi(d) dd
Finally, using the equations given above, we can obtain the expression for E[!
+
ij] as
follows:
E[!
+
ij] = C2Fj(C2)[1   Fi(C2)]   C1Fj(C1)[1   Fi(C1)]
  j[Fj(C2)   Fj(C1)]   
2
j[fj(C1)   fj(C2)]
+ i[Fi(C2)Fj(C2)   Fi(C1)Fj(C1)] + 
2
i[fi(C1)Fj(C1)   fi(C2)Fj(C2)]
+ 
2
i
Z C2
C1
fi(d)fj(d) dd   i
Z C2
C1
fj(d)Fi(d) dd
+
Z C2
C1
d fj(d)Fi(d) dd111
Derivation of E[!
 
ij]
Function !
 
ij can be written as follows:
!
 
ij =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > :
C1   Dj; if Di  C1  Dj  C2,
C1   C2; if Di  C1  C2  Dj,
Di   C2; if C1  Di  C2  Dj,
Di   Dj; if C1  Di  Dj  C2,
0; otherwise.
Thus, using Equation (6.5), the expected value of !
 
ij can be derived as follows:
E[!
 
ij] = E[C1   DjjDi  C1  Dj  C2]Pr(Di  C1  Dj  C2)
+ E[C1   C2jDi  C1  C2  Dj]Pr(Di  C1  C2  Dj)
+ E[Di   C2jC1  Di  C2  Dj]Pr(C1  Di  C2  Dj)
+ E[Di   DjjC1  Di  Dj  C2]Pr(C1  Di  Dj  C2)
= Pr(Di  C1  Dj  C2)fE[C1   DjjC1  Dj  C2]g
+ (C1   C2)Pr(Di  C1  C2  Dj)
+ Pr(C1  Di  C2  Dj)fE[Di   C2jC1  Di  C2]g
+ Pr(C1  Di  Dj  C2)E[Di   DjjC1  Di  Dj  C2]
= Fi(C1)
Z C2
C1
(C1   d)fj(d) dd
+ (C1   C2)Fi(C1)[1   Fj(C2)] +
Z C2
C1
Z dj
C1
(di   dj)fj(dj)fi(di) ddi ddj
+ [1   Fj(C2)]
Z C2
C1
(d   C2)fi(d) dd
Next, we simplify the expressions for
R C2
C1
R dj
C1(di   dj)fj(dj)fi(di) ddi ddj,
R C2
C1 (C1  
d)fj(d) dd, and
R C2
C1 (d   C2) fi(d) dd. We get:112
Z C2
C1
Z dj
C1
(di   dj) fj(dj)fi(di) ddi ddj
=
Z C2
C1
Z dj
C1
di fj(dj)fi(di) ddi ddj  
Z C2
C1
Z dj
C1
dj fj(dj)fi(di) ddi ddj
=
Z C2
C1
[i[Fi(dj)   Fi(C1)] + 
2
i[fi(C1)   fi(dj)]]fj(dj) ddj
 
Z C2
C1
djfj(dj)[Fi(dj)   Fi(C1)] ddj
= i
Z C2
C1
Fi(d)fj(d) dd   iFi(C1)[Fj(C2)   Fj(C1)]
+ 
2
ifi(C1)[Fj(C2)   Fj(C1)]   
2
i
Z C2
C1
fi(d)fj(d) dd
 
Z C2
C1
dfj(d)Fi(d) dd
+ Fi(C1)[j[Fj(C2)   Fj(C1)] + 
2
j[fj(C1)   fj(C2]]
Z C2
C1
(C1   d)fj(d) dd = C1[Fj(C2)   Fj(C1)]   j[Fj(C2)   Fj(C1)] + 
2
j[fj(C1)   fj(C2)]
Z C2
C1
(d   C2)fi(d) dd = i[Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)] + 
2
i[fi(C1)   fi(C2)]   C2[Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)]
Thus, the expression of E[!
 
ij] can be written as:
E[!
 
ij] = C1 Fi(C1)[1   Fj(C1)]   C2 Fi(C2)[1   Fj(C2)]
+ i[Fi(C2)(1   Fj(C2))   Fi(C1)(1   Fj(C1)] + 
2
ifi(C1)[1   Fj(C1)]
  
2
ifi(C2)[1   Fj(C2)] + i
Z C2
C1
fj(d)Fi(d) dd
  
2
i
Z C2
C1
fi(d)fj(d) dd  
Z C2
C1
d fj(d)Fi(d) dd (6.16)113
Derivations of E[!ij]
Recall that for i 2 L and k = 1;2,
aki = minfCk;Dig =
8
> <
> :
Ck; if Ck < Di,
Di; otherwise.
Thus,
E[aki] = Ck Pr(Ck < Di) + E[DijDi  Ck]P(Di  Ck)
= Ck[1   Fi(Ck)] + Fi(Ck)[i  
1
Fi(Ck)

2
ifi(Ck)];by Equation (6.3)
= Ck[1   Fi(Ck)] + Fi(Ck)i   
2
ifi(Ck) (6.17)
Therefore, E[!ij] can be written as follows:
E[!ij] = E[i   j]
= E[a2i   a1i]   E[a2j   a1j]
= C2[1   Fi(C2)] + Fi(C2)i   
2
ifi(C2)   fC1[1   Fi(C1)] + Fi(C1)i   
2
ifi(C1)g
  fC2[1   Fj(C2)] + Fj(C2)j   
2
jfj(C2)g + C1[1   Fj(C1)] + Fj(C1)j   
2
jfj(C1)
= Fi(C2)(i   C2) + Fi(C1)(C1   i) + 
2
i[fi(C1)   fi(C2)]
  Fj(C2)(j   C2)   Fj(C1)(C1   j)   
2
j[fj(C1)   fj(C2)] (6.18)114
Derivations of V ar(i) and V ar(!ij)
Using Equations 6.6 - 6.10, we obtain the following:
V ar(i) = (
2
i + 
2
i) [Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)] + 
2
i [(C1 + i)fi(C1)   (C2 + i)fi(C2)]
  2C1i [Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)]   2C1
2
i [fi(C1)   fi(C2)]
+ (C
2
2   2C1C2)[1   Fi(C2)] + C
2
1 [1   Fi(C1)]
  f(C2   C1) + Fi(C2) (i   C2) + Fi(C1)(C1   i) + 
2
i [fi(C1)   fi(C2)]g
2
V ar[!ij] = V ar(i) + V ar(j)
= f(
2
i + 
2
i) [Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)] + 
2
i [(C1 + i)fi(C1)   (C2 + i)fi(C2)]
  2C1i [Fi(C2)   Fi(C1)]   2C1
2
i [fi(C1)   fi(C2)]
+ (C
2
2   2C1C2) [1   Fi(C2)] + C
2
1 [1   Fi(C1)]
  f(C2   C1) + Fi(C2)(i   C2) + Fi(C1)(C1   i) + 
2
i [fi(C1)   fi(C2)]g
2g
  f(
2
j + 
2
j) [Fj(C2)   Fj(C1)] + 
2
j [(C1 + j)fj(C1)   (C2 + j)fj(C2)]
  2C1j[Fj(C2)   Fj(C1)]   2C1
2
j[fj(C1)   fj(C2)]
+ (C
2
2   2C1C2) [1   Fj(C2)] + C
2
1[1   Fj(C1)]
  f(C2   C1) + Fj(C2)(i   C2) + Fj(C1)(C1   j) + 
2
j [fj(C1)   fj(C2)]g
2g
The next section shows the details of all derivations in Preliminaries II of Chap-
ter 3.
Derivations in Section 3.5.2
Most results in Section 3.5.2 can be derived by making use of the derivations in Sec-
tion 6.1. Therefore, here we only detail the expressions that are obatained dierently.115
First two derivatives of E[!
+
ij] with respect to C2
Using Equation (3.8) in Chapter 3, we can rewrite function !
+
ij as follows:
!
+
ij =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > :
C2   Dj; if C1  Dj  C2  Di,
C2   C1; if Dj  C1  C2  Di,
Di   C1; if Dj  C1  Di  C2,
Di   Dj; if C1  Dj  Di  C2,
0; otherwise.
We will derive
E[!+
ij]
C2 using the denition of derivative. That is, if we let !
+
ij(C2) be
the value of function !
+
ij at parameter C2, then
E[!
+
ij]
C2
= lim
!0[
E[!
+
ij(C2 + )]   E[!
+
ij(C2)]

]
We let  = !
+
ij(C2 + )   !
+
ij(C2). We have:
If C1  Dj  C2  Di, then
 If C1  Dj  C2 +   Di )  = 
 If C1  Dj  Di  C2 +  )  = Di   C2  
If Dj  C1  C2  Di, then
 If Dj  C1  C2 +   Di )  = 
 If Dj  C1  Di  C2 +  )  = Di   C2  
If Dj  C1  Di  C2, then116
 Dj  C1  Di  C2 +  )  = 0
If C1  Dj  Di  C2, then
 C1  Dj  Di  C2 +  )  = 0
Thus,
E[!
+
ij]
C2
= lim
!0[
E[!
+
ij(C2 + )]   E[!
+
ij(C2)]

] = lim
!0[
1

E()]
= lim
!0
1

[Pr(C1  Dj  C2 +   Di;C1  Dj  C2  Di)
+ (Di   C2)Pr(C1  Dj  Di  C2 + ;C1  Dj  C2  Di)
+ Pr(Dj  C1  C2 +   Di;Dj  C1  C2  Di)
+ (Di   C2)Pr(Dj  C1  Di  C2 + ;Dj  C1  C2  Di)]
= Pr(C1  Dj  C2  Di) + Pr(Dj  C1  C2  Di)
= Pr(Di  C2) [Pr(C1  Dj  C2) + Pr(Dj  C1)]
= [1   Fi(C2)] Fj(C2)
Similarly, we obtain:
2E[!
+
ij]
C2
2
=  fi(C2)Fj(C2) + [1   Fi(C2)]fj(C2)
=  fi(C2)Fj(C2)   Fi(C2)fj(C2) + fj(C2)
Next, we study the relationship of the probability functions, p
+
ij and p
 
ij, with
respect to the demand standard deviations.117
Consider any leg i 2 L1 and j 2 L2. We have:
p
+
ij
i
= Fj(C2)fi(C2)
(C2   i)
i
+
1
3
i
Z C2
C1
Fj(d)fi(d) [ (d   i)
2   
2
i ] dd
p
+
ij
j
=
(j   C2)
j
fj(C2)[1   Fi(C2)] +
Z C2
C1
fi(d)fj(d)
(j   d)
j
dd
p
 
ij
i
=
(i   C2)
i
fi(C2)[1   Fj(C2)] +
Z C2
C1
fi(d)fj(d)
(i   d)
i
dd
p
 
ij
j
= Fi(C2)fj(C2)
(C2   j)
j
+
1
3
j
Z C2
C1
Fi(d)fj(d) [ (d   j)
2   
2
j ] dd
Through numerical integration, we evaluate the probabilities p
+
ij and p
 
ij as i
varies, considering j = 119;j = 15 and i = f93;112;140;210g; see Figure 3.13.
Similarly, Figure 6.1 depicts how p
+
ij and p
 
ij change as j varies, considering i =
119;i = 15 and j = f93;112;140;210g. From the graphs, we can see that functions
p
+
ij and p
 
ij can be either increasing or decreasing in i or j. However, the rst
derivative converts to zero as i or j becomes large enough; that is, the corresponding
probability function converges to a constant. Interestingly, the convergence points of
p
+
ij are similar for dierent values of i, and we have a similar observation for p
 
ij.
Figures
In this section, we depict several gures that are used in our analysis.118
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Figure 6.1: a) p
+
ij versus j; b) p
 
ij versus j.119
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Figure 6.3: E[GL
ij] = maxfE[!ij];0g versus j.120
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Figure 6.4: a) p
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ij versus j; b) p
 
ij versus j.121
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Figure 6.5: a) E[GP
ij] versus i; b) E[GP
ij] versus j.
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Figure 6.6: E[GP
ij] versus demand imbalance for 2 legs.122
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
-100 -50 0 50 100
demand imbalance
c.v. = 0.2
c.v. = 0.15
Figure 6.7: E[GL
ij] versus demand imbalance for 2 legs.
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Figure 6.8: E[GP
ij] and E[GL
ij] versus demand imbalance for 2 legs.123
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Figure 6.9: E[GP
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ij] versus demand imbalance for 2 legs.Vita
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